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ALIGNING EDUCATION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
By JoshuaE. Weishart*
Over the course offive decades and three waves of litigation, courts have
approvedremedies under the state constitutionalright to education that demand
more equitableand adequatefunding ofpublic schools. Scholars have urgently
calledfor a 'fourth wave" of litigation seeking remedies beyond money: racial
and socioeconomic integration,school choice, universalpreschool, and teacher
tenure reform, just to name a few. Desperatefor progress and to escape the
incessantrut ofschoolfunding battles, advocates have, in turn, initiatedlawsuits
seeking a broader range of remedies. If this strategy induces a fourth wave,
advocates will encounter a beleagueredstatejudiciarystill skeptical that courtdirectedremedies do not invade the provinces of the other coordinatebranches.
State courts are unlikely to overcome these doubts until they adopt cohesive
standards aligning educationrights and remedies.
This Article proposes that alignment can be achieved through reasonably
congruent judicial remedies and directly proportional legislative remedies.
Both standards gauge whether a remedy effectuates the right to education's
function to protect children from the harms of educational deprivations and
disparities. Both remedialstandardsare configuredfor thatpurpose to operate
within the boundaries set for each branch by state separation of powers
principles, conferring guided deference to legislative remedies and closer
scrutiny ofjudicial remedies. The Article briefly previews two proposedfourthwave, injunctive remedies-integration and choice-suggesting each must
overcome evidentiary deficits to satisfy the reasonablecongruence standard.
INTRODUCTION

Advance. Retreat. Surrender. Tactically speaking, these are the options
available to courts deciding claims brought under the state constitutional right
to education. The battlefield metaphor seems misplaced, but it is hardly
*Associate Professor of Law and Policy, College of Law and John D. Rockefeller IV School
of Policy and Politics, West Virginia University. My thanks to the editors for the invitation to
publish this Article for the Kansas JournalofLaw & PublicPolicy Symposium, "Public Education
Policy in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities." I remain indebted to Derek Black for
his scholarship, guidance, and comments on a completed draft of this Article. I also gratefully
acknowledge the financial support of the Arthur B. Hodges Research Grant.
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hyperbole.'
Lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of school finance
systems are often said to incite a "battle," 2 even a "war, 3 or at least "an oldfashioned western shootout"4 between courts and legislatures-"an inter-branch
conflict" 5 that can quickly escalate into a "tension-fraught," 6 "constitutional

showdown," which like a Russian novel, is "long, tedious, and everybody dies
in the end." 8
Just as school funding battles intensified, courts in six states surrendered.
They refused to even entertain the merits of these lawsuits for fear of being
ensnared in a decades-long dispute over what they deduced were political
questions committed to the legislature by the constitution. 9 "The landscape is
littered with courts that have been bogged down in the legal quicksand of
continuous litigation and challenges to their states' school funding systems,"
remarked a skittish Nebraska Supreme Court.' 0 Ceding authority to interpret
and enforce the education clauses in their constitutions, however, came at a high
cost: the right to education in those states has been downgraded to a nominal,
nonjusticiable duty." As collateral damage, millions of schoolchildren with
claims under that right lack a legal remedy because the judicial branch of
government is essentially closed to them, perhaps indefinitely.1 2 Judicial
1. It is not uncommon to find similar descriptors of civil litigation, see Vincent
Cardi, Litigation as Violence, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 677, 678 (2014), but combat-themed
accounts of school finance litigation are pervasive and ominous, not merely colloquial.
2. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Education'sElusive Future, StoriedPast, andthe Fundamental
Inequities Between, 46 GA. L. REV. 557, 592 (2012); Joy Chia & Sarah A. Seo, Battle of the
Branches: The Separation ofPowers Doctrine in State Education FundingSuits, 41 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROBS. 125, 147 (2007); Joseph S. Patt, Note, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It's
All Just a Change in Attitudes, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 575 (1999).
3. Michael J. Churgin, Peter H. Ehrenberg & Peter T. Grossi, Jr., Note, A StatisticalAnalysis
of the School FinanceDecisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1303
(1972); John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who's Winning the War?, 57
VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2355 (2004); Richard E. Levy, The War of JudicialIndependence: Letters
from the Kansas Front, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 725, 728-29 (2017).
4. Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral:Legislative vs. JudicialPower in the Kansas
School FinanceLitigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (2006).
5. Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutionsand Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence in
School FinanceLitigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301, 364 (2011).
6. Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciabilityand the Role ofCourts in Adequacy
Litigation:Preservingthe ConstitutionalRight to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 88 (2010).
7. Sanford Levinson, Courts as Participantsin "Dialogue":A View from American States,
59 U. KAN. L. REV. 791, 816 (2011).
8. Mark G. Yudof, School FinanceReform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 499, 499 (1991).
9. See Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 819 (Ala. 2002); Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in
Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 406-08 (Fla. 1996); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar,
672 N.E.2d 1178, 1190-93 (Ill. 1996); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731
N.W.2d 164, 178-80 (Neb. 2007); Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. State, 158 P.3d 1058, 1066 (Okla. 2007);
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57-59 (R.I. 1995).
10. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d at 183.
11. See Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915,94244(2016).
12. But see William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 443-46 (Pa. 2017)
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restraint rather than abdication would have been more defensible, considering
that the source of judges' trepidation lies not with their authority to interpret the
constitution but their ability to enforce it with a remedy that the other branches
would be willing and able to execute.13
Remedial concerns in fact prompted most courts that waded into the battle
to retreat.1 4 A few recoiled almost immediately, entertaining the merits of the
claim but denying any violation in the face of substantial educational
deprivations and disparities.' 5
More courts courageously declared a
constitutional violation but declined to specify a remedy or give guidance about
necessary remedial action out of deference to legislative prerogatives and
separation of powers.1 6 This fallback position offered a false sense of security,
however. In some cases, the legislatures simply held out and won the battle by
attrition. '7
Ohio's "thirteen-year battle over school financing" serves as the cautionary
tale of remedial restraint cowering into full scale retreat.' 8 In DeRolph I, the
first of four decisions declaring the school finance system unconstitutional, the
supreme court deferred to the legislature to devise a remedial scheme that would
constitute "a complete systematic overhaul" of the system.1 9 The legislature
resisted. In turn, the court offered only the most general guidance regarding a
remedy in DeRolph H.20 The legislature's response was to enact measures that

(setting aside as noncontrolling decades-old precedent that suggested claims under state education
clause or equal protection were nonjusticiable).
13. See William E. Thro, JudicialHumility: The Enduring Legacy of Rose v. Councilfor
Better Education, 98 KY. L.J. 717, 734 (2009) ("Because school finance issues are always
justiciable, the separation of powers question focuses exclusively on the issue of remedy.").
14. See Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalismfor the Right to Education, 48
GA. L. REV. 949, 1011 (2014) ("[S]ystemic educational reform litigation has often led to intractable
conflicts between state legislatures and state courts. Where these battles are joined, the courts
typically retreat.").
15. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 168 (Ga. 1981); Hornbeck v. Somerset
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 790 (Md. 1983); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315-16 (Minn.
1993); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142-43 (Va. 1994); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d
568, 577 (Wis. 1989).
16. See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: JudicialReview of Educational
Adequacy and the Separation ofPowers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 742 (2010)
(identifying courts in eleven states that have engaged in such "remedial abstention").
17. See, e.g., Anne M. Haynes, Note, Tension in the Judicial-LegislativeRelationship:
DeRolph v. State, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 611, 649 (2001) ("[T]he legislature has learned that if they
hold out long enough the court will surrender to practicality and the legislature will have its way
(like a child having a temper tantrum who outfoxes the parent).").
18. Shadya Yazback, Note, School Financing in Ohio Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow:
Searchingfor a "Thorough andEfficient" System ofPublic Schools, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671,
671-72 (2007).
19. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph 1), 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997).
20. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II), 728 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (Ohio 2000) (defining a "thorough
and efficient" system as one in which "each and every school district has enough funds to operate"
and "an ample number of teachers, sound buildings that are in compliance with state fire and
building codes, and equipment sufficient for all students to be afforded an educational
opportunity").
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fell far short of a complete overhaul. 2' Political and economic pressures in the
interim meant the court would have to contend with a fractious legislature
anxious "to tighten its belt in the face of shrinking revenues." 22 In DeRolph III,
the court thus abandoned its demand for a complete overhaul but nevertheless
ordered the legislature "to substantially increase the base funding amount per
student." 23 The state balked. Just fifteen months later, the court vacated
DeRolph III and its injunctive remedy, declared that the system remained
unconstitutional in DeRolph IV, yet "relinquished its jurisdiction over the matter,
effectively waiving the white flag and washing its hands of the dispute." 24
Undoubtedly, "battle fatigue" set in.25 "The Ohio Supreme Court's
decisions were greeted with proposals to strip the courts of jurisdiction over
school funding cases, ignore the Court's orders, or even to impeach one or more
of the justices." 26 Here too there was collateral damage, not as much as from
judicial abdication, but "judicial restraint" arguably provided only modest gains
in improving "the education of the generation of children who attended [Ohio]
schools during that period." 27 Similarly, millions more children will be
impacted by the sudden retreat of the Texas Supreme Court which most recently
excused a $5 billion decrease in school funding-a move that "doubled down
on how deferential it is to the legislature."28
The few courts that have advanced resolutely into battle exercised less
judicial restraint, specifying a remedy or giving guidance about remedial
measures to cure the constitutional violation. 29 The paradigm example here is
the New Jersey Supreme Court which "has been the most aggressive of any in
enforcing education rights and duties."30 Its battle has been waging in one form

21. William S. Koski, The PoliticsofJudicialDecision-Makingin EducationalPolicyReform
Litigation, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1166-67 (2004).
22. Id. at 1167.
23. Id. at 1167-68 (citing DeRolph v. State (DeRolph III), 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1189-90, 121416 (Ohio 2001)).
24. Id. at 1169-70 (citing DeRolph v. State (DeRolph IV), 780 N.E.2d 529, 529-32 (Ohio
2002)).
25. Larry J. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and Ohio'sLong Road to an Adequate Education, 2005
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83, 140 (2005).
26. Id. at 85.
27. Sonja Ralston Elder, Note, Standing Up to Legislative Bullies: Separation of Powers,
State Courts, andEducationalRights,57 DUKE L.J. 755, 778 (2007); see also Bill Bush & Shannon
Gilchrist, 20 Years After DeRolph Decision, Some School DistrictsGained, Some Lost, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Sept. 22, 2017, 6:10 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/news/20170922/20-years-afterderolph-decision-some-school-districts-gained-some-lost [https://perma.cc/ RDS8-5MG6].
28. Albert Kauffman, The Texas Supreme CourtRetreatsfrom ProtectingTexas Students, 19
SCHOLAR: ST. MARY'S L. REV. ON RACE & Soc. JUST. 145, 151, 164, 168 n.173 (2017).
29. See Bauries, supra note 16, at 742-43, 742 n.225 (counting courts in seven states that
entered or approved entry of "policy-directive remedial orders, ranging from requiring the
legislative body in the state to commission a third-party study to determine the cost of providing
an adequate education system, to mandating the actual appropriation of additional state funding for
education").
30. Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis:FundingCuts, Teacher Shortages, andthe
Dwindling Commitment to PublicEducation, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 423, 453 (2016).
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or another since the early 1970s. "If Ohio's struggle seems exhausting, New
Jersey endured the legal equivalent of the Thirty Years' War." 31 Make that a
Forty Years' War, provoking more than twenty decisions in which the court has
taken the state to task for failing to adequately and equitably fund schools. The
court has rebuffed the argument that the court should defer to the legislature's
plenary power and not order budget appropriations to remedy violations. 32 "Like
anyone else," the court has reiterated, "the State is not free to walk away from
judicial orders enforcing constitutional obligations."33
Yet the court then enabled the legislature to stray considerably from that
direction. Limiting its holding to certain school districts, the court ordered $500
million in cuts be restored to those districts while effectively excusing another
"$600 million in cuts to [other] disadvantaged districts."34 The ruling perhaps
signals the court's "substantial shift away from its more aggressive stances of
the past" in denying "the full remedy that just a few years earlier the court had
seemingly mandated."35
The New Jersey Supreme Court is not alone in bearing the scars of battle.
In an unprecedented move, the Washington Supreme Court was forced to impose
contempt sanctions ($100,000 per day) on the legislature for its repeatedly
failure to devise a remedial school finance plan as ordered.36 It remains to be
seen whether those sanctions will ensure full compliance. 37 In Kansas, the "War
of Judicial Independence" culminated in a "well-financed effort to unseat four
Supreme Court justices," with all four nevertheless winning their retention
elections.38 In the buildup to that effort, the legislature purported to strip the
court of authority to enjoin funding and to appoint chief judges, threatened to
change the means of judicial selection to exert more control over the process,
and imposed deadlines for issuing appellate decisions. 39 "None of these
measures, however, has deterred the Kansas courts, which have avoided or
invalidated each of them."40 Moreover, the Kansas Supreme Court has
continued invalidating the state's school finance scheme, most recently
concluding it is both inequitable and inadequate. 4
Still, the collateral damage to schoolchildren-although mitigated in states
where courts have advanced rather than surrendered or retreated-accrues
31. Madeline Davis, Note & Comment, Off the ConstitutionalMap: Breaking the Endless
Cycle ofSchoolFinance Litigation, 2016 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 117, 132 (2016).
32. Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IX), 20 A.3d 1018, 1024 (N.J. 2011).
33. Id
34. Black, supra note 30, at 455.
35. Id
36. See Contempt Order at 9-10, McCleary v. State (McClearyII), 269 P.3d 227 (Wash. Aug.
13, 2015) (No. 84362-7); Continuing Contempt Order at 11, McCleary v. State (McClearylll), 269
P.3d 227 (Wash. Oct. 6, 2016) (No. 84362-7).
37. Continuing Contempt Order at 44, McCleary v. State (McCleary IV), 269 P.3d 227
(Wash. Nov. 15, 2017) (No. 84362-7).
38. Levy, supra note 3, at 725-26.
39. Id at 729-34.
40. Id at 746.
41. Gannon v. State (Gannon V), 402 P.3d 513 (Kan. 2017).
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steadily. For instance, like many states, Kansas faces a severe teacher shortage
with teacher pay in some rural areas ranking the lowest in the country.42 The
shortage comes more than a decade after the Kansas Supreme Court first held
the state's school finance scheme unconstitutional.43 Washington receives an
"F" in a recent school funding fairness report measuring the state's "effort" on
education spending in relation to its economic productivity, and the state ranks
near the bottom on teacher wage competitiveness.44 The low rankings come
almost forty years after the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed the state's
"paramount duty" to make "ample provision" for the education of its children.45
Surveying the battlefield, the impression is that state courts are losing
ground even as a few remain vigilant. Whether they take a defensive or offensive
tactical posture, it is evident that no court wishes to die on the last proverbial hill
marked 'remedy.' Active-duty courts now approach school funding lawsuits
"with increased caution, an eye toward the perceived efficacy of their work, and
greater concern over the prospect of constitutional quagmire vis-a-vis
recalcitrant state legislatures."46 All the while, courts angle for the quickest
"judicial exit strategy" when it comes to the remedy.47 If past is prologue, these
battles inevitably will end with a whimper not a bang, driven by the inertia of
appeasement and political expediency.
Courts simply "grow tired of
superintending funding schemes."4 8 Yet any resulting peace in defeat is without
honor; the tacit or explicit terms of surrender demand that courts abdicate their
authority to enforce an affirmative constitutional right. Therefore, "the practical
effect of judicial disengagement and under-enforcement is to undermine and
retract previously established education rights and duties themselves." 49
The looming devaluation of the state constitutional right to education has
provoked a sense of urgency for a new battle plan. Some scholars have implored
plaintiffs to "find a way to recharacterize both the right and the remedy so that
42. Celia Llopis-Jepsen, Rural Kansas Teacher Pay Ranks Lowest in U.S., Adds to Hiring
Challenges for School Districts, KCUR 89.3 (June 23, 2017), http://kcur.org/post/rural-kansas[https:
teacher-pay-ranks-lowest-us-adds-hiring-challenges-school-districts#stream/0
//perma.cc/M8KN-MPSR]; see also Black, supra note 30, at 424-25, 443-44.
43. Montoy v. State, 102 P.3d 1160 (Kan. 2005).
44. BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 17, 26
(7th ed. 2018), http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/publications/IsSchoolFunding
Fair_7thEditi.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZXB8-UP9C].
45. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 76 (Wash. 1978).
46. William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of the Next Generation of
EducationalRights Litigation, 117 COLUM. L. REv. 1897, 1899 (2017).
47. See Randall T. Shepard, State ConstitutionalRemedies and JudicialExit Strategies, 45
NEW ENG. L. REV. 879, 896 (2011) ("[T]he remedy should set the stage for closing out the litigation
on some foreseeable timetable if all issues before the court have been resolved.").
48. James F. Ryan, Standards, Testing, andSchool FinanceLitigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1223,
1260 (2008).
49. Black, supra note 30, at 462, 463-66 (contending that under-enforcement also (1)
"deprives marginalized stakeholders of a role in the education decisionmaking process and
reinforces the status quo," (2) "excuses the state from justifying an override of its constitutional
education duties," and (3) reorders "preferences in direct opposition to constitutional text and
precedent in many states").
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they cannot be boiled down to a demand for increased funding." 5 0 That proposal
echoes a crescendo of erstwhile calls for a new, "fourth wave" of litigation. 5 ' At
the risk of mixing metaphors, school finance "battles" have generally proceeded
in "three waves," all of which have focused on more equitable or adequate
school funding. 52 Fourth-wave proponents suggest that, because funding-based
remedies and guidance set the stage for inter-branch conflicts, plaintiffs should
focus "beyond dollars" on remedies that will get "a better reception in courts."53
Notably, a few "courts have already begun to explore a handful of legally and
politically plausible nonmonetary alternatives." 54 Apart from litigation strategy,
scholars have also reasoned that "because money alone is not the problem,
money alone cannot be the solution."
Equally true is that not every problem in education amounts to a
constitutional violation and not every solution to education warrants a
constitutional remedy. So, as the calls for fourth-wave remedies reach fever
pitch in desperate times, we should consider whether past and future remedies
align with education rights. Otherwise, we risk continuing on the choppy path
of the past three waves, which could further undermine the right and educational
justice. To steer clear and perhaps ease inter-branch tensions, courts need to
adopt standards that serve the "two basic functions" of constitutional remedies:
(1) to provide "redress" for constitutional violations and (2) support "structural"

50. Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 6, at 121; see Jared S. Buszin, Comment, Beyond School
Finance: Refocusing Education Reform Litigation to Realize the Deferred Dream of Education
Equality and Adequacy, 62 EMoRY L.J. 1613, 1616 (2013) ("[E]ducation reform litigants should
shift their attention to challenging local policies that cause an inequitable or inadequate distribution
of skill-based education inputs."); Julie Zwibelman, Note, Broadening the Scope ofSchoolFinance
and Resource Comparability Litigation, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 527, 529-30 (2001)
(proposing that school finance litigation should broaden its scope to include "racial integration and
enforceable, results-driven education reform").
51. See generally Christopher E. Adams, Comment, Is Economic Integration the Fourth
Wave in School Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613 (2007); David G. Hinojosa, "RaceConscious" School FinanceLitigation: Is a Fourth Wave Emerging?, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 869
(2016); Lauren Nicole Gillespie, Note, The Fourth Wave of Education Finance Litigation:
Pursuing a Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (2010); Kevin
Randall McMillan, Note, The Turning Tide: The EmergingFourth Wave ofSchool FinanceReform
Litigation and the Courts'Lingering InstitutionalConcerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867 (1998).
52. Each wave represented a different constitutional theory of liability: first wave equality
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause; second wave equity under state
constitution equal protection and education clauses; and third wave adequacy, also under state
constitution education clauses. See generally William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact ofthe
Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform
Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 222-32, 238-49 (1990). For critique of the wave metaphor, see
infra note 157.
53. See Koski, supra note 46, at 1900.
54. Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 6, at 121.
55. Derek W. Black, Taking Teacher QualitySeriously, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1617
(2016); see also James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 289 (1999) ("The
stronger the influence of peers on performance, the less likely it is that money will make much of
a difference and the more likely it is that changing the composition of the school will make a
difference.").

2018

WEISHART: EDUCATION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

353

norms "adequate to preserve separation-of-powers values."56 More precisely,
courts should adopt standards designed to ensure that the remedy effectuates the
constitutional right's function within the boundaries set for each branch by
separation of powers principles.
This Article thus proposes two separate remedial standards: direct
proportionalityand reasonable congruence.
The direct proportionality standard would govern a court's review of
legislative remedies intended to cure violations of the state constitutional right
to education. A legislative remedy would cure the violation if it is calculated to
ensure that the equity and adequacy of educational opportunities maintain an
upward, directly proportional relationship. Consistent with state separation of
powers principles, this is a highly deferential remedial standard because it entails
no judicial review of the legislative means or the fit between those means and
the constitutional ends. Nor does it even demand the actual achievement of the
constitutional ends. It does demand, however, that any legislative remedy
effectuates the right's function to protect children from the harms of educational
disparities and deprivations by setting equity and adequacy on a mutuallyreinforcing, upward trajectory that maintains proportionality between the them.
The reasonablecongruence standard would govern courts in contemplating
or reviewing injunctive relief to cure violations of the state constitutional right
to education. A court applying this standard would need to determine whether
substantial evidence shows that the requested injunctive relief is reasonably
calculated to set equity and adequacy on an upward trajectory. Consistent with
state separation of powers principles, this remedial standard is meant to secure
a reasonably close fit between the judicial remedy and the constitutional right so
that courts cannot be fairly accused of crossing the line between adjudication
and legislation.
The rationale for these remedial standards builds in Part I with a review of
the ever-fetching (and fledgling) fourth wave. That review suggests a fourth
wave has not emerged because courts continue to harbor separation of powers
concerns regarding fourth-wave remedies the very same concerns that plagued
the past three waves. Part II explains this persistent struggle is due in no small
measure to courts' under-theorization of the right to education and its
connections with past remedies (equality, equity, and adequacy). Judges must
be able to conclude that a particular remedy actually effectuates the right's
function. That function, according to state constitutional text and precedent, is
to protect children from the harms of educational deprivations and disparities.
Past remedies have aimed to protect children from the harms of either
educational disparities or depreciations, not both. But again, constitutional text
and precedent already point a way forward for courts: mutually enforce equity
and adequacy-ideally as an integral claim for equal liberty which
encapsulates the right's function.

56. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and

ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1787, 1790 (1991).
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Part III outlines two remedial standards to effectuate that function while
adhering to state separation of powers principles. Adapted from the federal
"congruence and proportionality" doctrine, these standards essentially entail a
highly deferential form of ends scrutiny for legislative remedies and a less
deferential means-ends testing for judicial remedies. Part III concludes with a
brief preview of the application of the reasonable congruence standard for two
proposed fourth-wave judicial remedies, integration and choice. That preview
suggests each remedy must overcome evidentiary deficits. Contrary to their
perceived strengths, those deficits in effectuating equal liberty fall on the
equality side for integration remedies, and the liberty side for a choice remedies.
I. THE EVER-FETCHING FOURTH WAVE

Fetch is the unobstructed distance over which wind blows in the same
direction to generate a wave. 7 The greater the fetch, wind speed, and wind
duration, the more intense the wave. 8 In law, as in nature, fetch helps explain
why a fourth wave of litigation under the state constitutional right to education
has not fully emerged. First of all, the winds have blown in different directions
rather than behind a single remedy. An assortment of remedies have been
proposed seeking interventions beyond (though often implicating) equitable and
adequate funding: racial or socioeconomic integration,59 improved standards,60
accountability measures, 6 ' compensatory services,62 institutional remedies,63

57. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644, 675 (E.D. La. 2009).
58. Id
59. Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as EducationalResources and the Constitutional

Right to EqualAccess, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373 (2012); Kristi L. Bowman, A New Strategyfor Pursuing
Racial andEthnic Equality in PublicSchools, 1 DUKE F. FOR L. & Soc. CHANGE 47 (2009); Molly
S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public

Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1355-56 (2004); Ryan, supra note 55, at 308; James E. Ryan,
Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529, 533-35 (1999);
Christopher A. Suarez, Note, Sliding Towards Educational Outcomes: A New Remedy for High-

Stakes EducationLawsuits in a Post-NCLB World, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 477 (2010); Zwibelman,
supra note 50, at 529-30.
60. Jill Ambrose, Note, A Fourth Wave of Education Funding Litigation: How Education
Standards and Costing-OutStudies Can Aid Plaintiffs in Pennsylvaniaand Beyond, 19 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 107 (2009).
61. MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH
THE STATE COURTS 57 (2009).
62. Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the

Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 469 (2000) (proposing
"public and private tutoring programs"); Note, Education Policy Litigation as Devolution, 128
HARV. L. REV. 929, 930 (2015).
63. Shavar D. Jeffries, The Structural Inadequacy of Public Schools for Stigmatized
Minorities: The Need for Institutional Remedies, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1 (2006); Aaron
Saiger, Note, DisestablishingLocal School Districts as a Remedy for EducationalInadequacy, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1830 (1999).
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universal preschool, 64 public boarding schools, 65 school discipline reform, 66
school choice,67 private school vouchers,68 public school vouchers,69 teacher
tenure and evaluation reform, 70 multicultural and bilingual curriculum,7 ' and the

equitable distribution of quality teachers 72 with still other remedies as potential
offshoots. 73 So, fourth-wave remedies have been fetching, just not in the
navigational sense that could generate an intense wave of litigation.
Second, each time the winds have sustained favorably in the same direction,
the fourth wave has been curtailed by obstructions, most often in the form of
adverse decisions in which courts maintain reservations about enforcing the
remedy. This has been the pattern since the possibility of a fourth wave first
took shape in Sheffv. O'Neill.74 There, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that
racial segregation, de facto as well as de jure, violates the state constitution's
guarantee of "substantially equal educational opportunity and requires the state
to take further remedial measures."75 In a pair of articles published shortly after
the decision, James Ryan argued that Sheff should herald a fourth wave of
litigation in which plaintiffs seek nonmonetary remedies for violations of state
constitutional rights to an equal or adequate education.76 Specifically, Ryan
proposed racial and socioeconomic integration as well as school choice.
But the fourth wave did not surge after Sheffpartially because of Sheff The
decision obstructed itself by (1) limiting "relief to a declaratory judgment that

64. James E. Ryan, A ConstitutionalRight to Preschool?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49 (2006); see
also Kevin Woodson, Why KindergartenIs Too Late: The Needfor Early Childhood Remedies in
School FinanceLitigation, 70 ARK. L. REV. 87 (2017).
65. Bret D. Asbury & Kevin Woodson, On the Need for PublicBoarding Schools, 47 GA. L.
REV. 113 (2012); Shelaswau Bushnell Crier, Beyond Money: Public Urban BoardingSchools and
the State's Obligationto Make an Adequate Education Attainable, 44 J.L. & EDUC. 23 (2015).
66. Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2016).
67. Ryan, supra note 55, at 310-14; Ryan, supra note 59, at 560-62; Aaron Jay Saiger, School
Choice and States'Duty to Support "Public"Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 909, 969 (2007).
68. Greg D. Andres, Comment, PrivateSchool Voucher Remedies in Education Cases, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 795, 796 (1995).
69. Adams, supra note 51, at 1652.
70. See Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 75, 107, 123-42 (2016) (identifying reform movement which argues "that tenure and retention
policies violate students' right to an adequate and equitable education" and explaining, that
although claim is facially valid based on existing school funding precedent, it raises serious
evidentiary and causation problems as well as justiciability concerns).
71. Hinojosa, supra note 51.
72. Black, supra note 55; Buszin, supra note 50.
73. Kevin G. Welner, Silver Linings Casebook: How Vergara's Backers May Lose by
Winning, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 121, 141 (2015) (suggesting legal
challenges to "inequities in class size," "grade retention," "access to enriched and engaging
curriculum, transportation, buildings and facilities," and "access to and use of technology," among
others previously mentioned).
74. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
75. Id. at 1281.
76. Ryan, supra note 55, at 307-309; Ryan, supra note 59, at 553-54; see also McMillian,
supra note 51, at 1896-1902 (noting potential for fourth wave a year after Sheff).
77. Ryan, supra note 55, at 308-15; Ryan, supra note 59, at 555-62.
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the school districting and boundary-drawing system was unconstitutional"
despite the broad sweep of the court's finding that defacto segregation violated
the state constitution and (2) failing to specify a remedy. 8 Instead, the court
advised "the legislature and the executive branch to put the search for
appropriate remedial measures at the top of their respective agendas." 79 The
dissent predicted that this failure to articulate a "principle upon which to
structure such a remedy" would be problematic.80 And indeed the plaintiffs were
forced to return to court repeatedly to induce more state action.8' It took the
parties seven years to negotiate "Phase 1" of a settlement agreement-a
"voluntary integration plan requiring the construction of eight new magnet
schools to attract suburban White children to the urban center" 82 and "a statewide inter-district public school attendance program [permitting] students from
Hartford to attend suburban schools on a space-available basis."83 Following
subsequent court appearances and settlement agreements, the parties are
negotiating "Phase 4," some twenty-one years after the initial decision. 84 To be
sure, Sheff "led to important reforms, [but] many of the conditions the case
sought to remedy remain just as bad as before."
The putative fourth wave thus began with a court emulating the reluctance
of courts in the preceding three waves to specify or give much guidance about
the remedy. Two follow-on suits asserted the alternative claim that Sheff
declined to reach because it was not argued in the lower courts-that
socioeconomic and racial segregation deprives students of an adequate
education.8 6 Neither court had to grapple with the remedy, however. The first
case, Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. State of Minnesota, settled without
the court deciding the claim. And the second case, Paynter v. State, failed to
state a cognizable claim.88 Paynter was arguably based on "the precise nature
and limits of the constitutional right to education in New York rather than a
conceptual rejection of the plaintiffs' claim." 89 Regardless, by leaving the legal
theory for the remedy untested or calling it into question, the Minnesota and
78. Jim Hilbert, Restoring the Promise of Brown: Using State Constitutional Law to
Challenge School Segregation, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 42 (2017).
79. Sheff 678 A.2d at 1290-91.
80. Id at 1295-96 (Borden, J., dissenting); see also James K. Gooch, Fenced in: Why Sheff
v. O'Neill Can't Save Connecticut'sInner City Students, 22 QUINNIPLAC L. REV. 395, 415 (2004)
(agreeing with dissent that "failure to offer a standard by which improvement could be judged" or
"a limiting principle" to the court's mandate inhibited progress).
81. Justin R. Long, Comment, Enforcing Affirmative State ConstitutionalObligations and
Sheff v. O'Neill, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 293-95 (2002).
82. Goodwin Liu, The PartedPaths ofSchool Desegregationand School FinanceLitigation,
24 LAW & INEQ. 81, 104-05 (2006).
83. Suarez, supra note 59, at 484.
84. See Measuring Progress, SHEFF MOVEMENT, http://sheffmovement.org/measuringprogress/ [https://perma.cc/75W8-DUW5].
85. Hilbert, supra note 78, at 43 (citing Suarez, supra note 59, at 478).
86. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1267, 1286 (Conn. 1996).
87. Black, supra note 59, at 382-83.
88. Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (N.Y. 2003).
89. Black, supra note 59, at 384.
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New York litigations were little more than ripples in Sheff s wake.
Around the same time, an effort to recognize access to publicly funded
preschool under the state constitutional right to education also stalled after
initially gaining momentum in New Jersey when state supreme courts in North
Carolina, Arkansas, and Massachusetts, "declined to recognize a right to
preschool, all overturning trial court decisions that had done so." 90 Renewing
his call for a fourth wave, Ryan defended access to preschool as a viable remedy
against separation of powers arguments that it was a "public-policy issue for the
[legislature] to explore and resolve." 91 Ryan argued that, because courts must
"give content" to the right to education, it would be inconsistent for them to
identify some educational inputs (e.g., per-pupil expenditures) "within the
definition of the right to equal or adequate educational opportunities" while
excluding others (e.g., preschool) as nonjusticiable. 92 Despite such prodding,
"the judicial embrace of early childhood education that Ryan envisioned is no
closer to coming to fruition" now more than a decade later. 93 Only two appellate
court decisions in North Carolina and South Carolina have since recognized
explicitly that access to preschool can help remedy educational inadequacies. 94
Both are of limited value, however; the North Carolina decision was vacated,
rendered moot by modest legislative amendments,95 and the South Carolina
decision did not actually impose a specific remedy and, in any event, was later
overturned.96
This fourth-wave pattern of fits and starts has persisted most recently in
legal challenges to teacher tenure laws and practices. The first of these
challenges, Vergara v. State, contended that easy-to-obtain "tenure and the
retention of ineffective teachers" engendered unequal educational opportunities
and violated California's constitutional right to education. 97 The trial court
agreed, ruling that the five challenged statutes harmed disadvantaged students
and thus violated the equal protection clause of the state constitution, under
which education is a fundamental right and wealth is a suspect classification. 98

90. Ryan, supra note 64, at 52, 52 nn.17-18 (citing Abbott v. Burke (Abbott Vl), 748 A.2d
82, 84-85 (N.J. 2000); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View Ill), 91 S.W.3d 472,
500-02 (Ark. 2002); Hancockv. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1156-57 (Mass. 2005); Hoke
Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke 1), 599 S.E.2d 365, 393-94 (N.C. 2004)).
91. Ryan, supra note 64, at 85 (quoting Lake View III, 91 S.W.3d at 501-02).
92. Id.
93. Woodson, supra note 64, at 88.
94. See Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State (Abbeville II), 767 S.E.2d 157, 180 (S.C. 2014);
Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 731 S.E.2d 691, 697 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); see also Gannon v.
State (Gannon V), 402 P.3d 513, 538 (Kan. 2017) (observing legislative bill providing "additional
$2 million for preschool-aged at-risk students" would be "helpful" but not sufficient "to remedy
overall violation" of funding inadequacy).
95. See Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke II), 749 S.E.2d 451, 455 (N.C. 2013).
96. See Order of Dismissal at 1, Abbeville V, No. 2007-065159 (Nov. 17, 2017) ("Abbeville
II was wrongly decided as violative of separation of powers.").
97. Black, supra note 70, at 78-79.
98. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, *5-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2014).

358

KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

Vol. XXVTT:3

"With that, the Vergara case sent shockwaves throughout the nation and
suggested the possibility of a tectonic shift in educational equity litigation, as
copycat litigation was filed in New York, Minnesota, and New Jersey." 99
But the would-be wave of teacher tenure litigation may have been
overhyped-an appellate court later reversed the trial court in Vergara,
concluding that the plaintiffs failed to "show that the statutes inevitably cause a
certain group of students to receive an education inferior to the education
received by other students." 00 The California Supreme Court subsequently
denied review of the appellate court decision, terminating the matter in state with
the highest K-1 2 student population.' 0' As of the date of this writing, the copycat
litigation has not fared much better.1 02 The tempering of expectations in these
cases is again explained in part by remedial concerns. "The potential solutions
to ineffective teaching and teacher removal are multifaceted," and thus, some
would argue more appropriately "within the domain of the legislature." 03
Thus far, the battle hymn of the putative fourth wave of litigation repeats
the refrain of the first three waves: "The remedy is the experience. This is the
dangerous liaison"1 04 between courts and legislatures. William Koski perceives
that plaintiffs sensitive to this dynamic are focusing now "on specific,
identifiable educational 'wrongs' that allegedly result in specific, identifiable
educational 'harms' to specific, identifiable students" as a way to make the
litigation more palatable to judges. 0 5 Koski observes "parallel tracks" along
which litigants are pursuing fourth wave remedies in what he labels "next
generation" cases.1 06 "On one rail are those who continue to focus on the
adequacy and equity of specific educational resources" (e.g., access to
99. Koski, supra note 46, at 1920 (citations omitted).
100. Vergara v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, 209
Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 558 (2016).
101. Id at 558.
102. The litigation appears most promising in the state with the fourth highest K-12
population, New York, where the challenge to tenure persists having overcome successive motions
to dismiss and may now proceed to trial. See Davids v. State, No. 101105/14, 2018 WL 1514129
(N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 28, 2018) (affirming trial court's denial of motion to dismiss, concluding
allegations state a claim for violation of state constitution). In neighboring New Jersey, the suit
claiming that the "last in, first out" mandates governing teacher layoffs violate the state constitution
education clause is on appeal from the trial court's dismissal. See H.G. v. Harrington, No. L-217016 (N.J. Super. Ct. May 4, 2017). And the Minnesota Supreme Court has agreed to review in part
an appellate court's dismissal of a suit asserting that tenure statutes violate the education and equal
protection clauses of the state constitution. See Forslund v. State, No. A 17-0033, 2017 WL 3864082
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017), review grantedin part (Nov. 14, 2017).
103. See Black, supra note 70, at 82 ("[P]resuming that eliminating tenure through
constitutional litigation is a solution, much less the best among competing possibilities, is
dangerous."); Michele Aronson, Note, The Deceptive Promise of Vergara: Why Teacher Tenure
Lawsuits Will Not Improve Student Achievement, 37 CARDOZO L. REv. 393, 425 (2015) ("[C]ourts
in teacher tenure lawsuits are constrained in the remedies and, by extension, the impact they
can have, because design of the remedies rests with the legislatures.").
104. See JASON MRAZ, The Remedy (I Won't Worry), on WAITING FOR MY ROCKET TO
COME (Elektra Records 2002).
105. Koski, supra note 46, at 1915-16.
106. Id at 1916.
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preschool, AP courses, instructional materials, clean and safe facilities). 0 7
Whereas "on the other rail are those who believe that the educational wrong
stems from inefficient management of those resources due to constraints on
administrative decision making and family liberty" (e.g., school choice, teacher
tenure, evaluation, and compensation).os Although it can be helpful to
distinguish and categorize the cases in this manner, there is also no conceptual
barrier forcing them to proceed on separate tracks. A case could argue that a
specific, identifiable educational harm derives from inefficient management of
an otherwise deprived educational resource.1 09
In either case, Koski foresees legal and political challenges ahead. Despite
the focus on specific educational wrongs and specific educational harms to
specific students, he thinks plaintiffs might still be hard-pressed to establish a
causal line between the two, "given the complexity that one may find beneath
superficially clear cause-effect relationships." 0 This is because of the variety
of factors that could be affecting academic performance."' Relatedly, he notes
that the issues raised in these cases-e.g., school choice, teacher tenure and
evaluation reform, and accountability-"are among the most empirically
contested and politically debated topics in education policy today."1 2 So, even
though the cases seek specific remedies for discrete educational harms "it is not
at all clear that courts will be willing to wade into the fray."1 3 Indeed, the
narrower the remedy sought, the less likely it may be sufficient (though perhaps
necessary) to improve educational opportunity overall.11 4 Koski therefore
concludes with an appeal for "modesty among courts and advocates for what we
can reasonably accomplish" and cautions that we "avoid unintended
consequences of our remedial policy choices."" 5
One way to heed that sound advice is by drawing much-needed attention to
the standards by which courts should measure the degree of fit (or expected gap)
between the state constitutional right to education and the remedy. Before
considering remedial standards, however, we must first understand the nature of
the relation between that right and its remedy.
II. REMEDYING THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION

The remedial failures of past and contemporary waves of education rights
litigation cannot be attributed solely to the remedies themselves but to their
disconnect with the rights they are meant to vindicate. Alas, most courts seem
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 1930 (calling for "litigation strategies that couple aspects of both rails of
reform: more resources combined with better accountability for how those resources are spent and
relaxation of regulations that create inefficiency in the deployment of those resources").
110. Id. at 1924-25.
111. Koski, supra note 46, at 1924-25.
112. Id. at 1927-28.
113. Id. at 1928.
114. Id. at 1930.
115. Id.
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resigned to toil under a rather "conceptually thin account" of the state
constitutional right to education.11 6 At the root of that right's "current underenforcement," however, is its "past under-theorization by courts."" 7 Prior legal
scholarship has not filled that "theoretical void," yielding "very general
descriptions of education rights" but otherwise making few inroads "to sketch
out the proper connections between rights and remedies."" 8 To that end, we
must first discern the state constitutional right to education "from the remedies
it might warrant."11 9
Once the right's purpose or function is properly
understood, we can analyze, for the benefit of future remedies, the ways in which
previous remedies have and have not served that function.
A. Remedying the 'Right' Function
Start with the basic proposition that a judicially created remedy should
effectuate the constitutional right that has been violated.1 20 Specifically, the
remedy should effectuate the right's function, i.e., "what rights do for those who
hold them."121 When children are deemed the rightholders, the most obvious
function of the state constitutional right to education is to obligate the state to
provide a public education.1 22 In this instance, no remedy is necessary because
"all states have fulfilled that function by providing a free, public education
system."1 23 And all states continue to perform under that duty by enacting
necessary legislation (e.g., education budgets) and by making and administering
education policy.1 24 But provision and performance cannot be the right's only
functions or else any education, however meager or rudimentary, would do.1 25
Surely the reason to command the state to educate children is tied

116. See Weishart, supra note 11, at 924; Black, supra note 30, at 463 ("[T]he right to
education is ill-defined in precedent and operates more on assumption and conjecture than analysis
and implementation.").
117. Black, supra note 30, at 463.
118. Bauries, supra note 16, at 756, 759.
119. See Black, supra note 30, at 463 ("While rights without remedies are practically
meaningless and the two cannot be entirely separated, rights and remedies are conceptually distinct.
Rights involve matters of constitutional principle, whereas remedies can implicate public policy.").

120. Abbot v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 445 (N.J. 1997) ("[T]here can be no
responsible dissent from the position that the Court has the constitutional obligation to do what it
can to effectuate and vindicate the constitutional rights of the school children."); see Bush v. Lucas,
462 U.S. 367, 374 (1983) (observing that constitutional grant of jurisdiction to decide cases
includes "authority to choose among available judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional

rights").
121. Leif Wenar, Rights, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., at § 2 (last updated July 2, 2011),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa1120 11 /entries/rights [https://perma.cc/D6F7-LXPF].
122. See Weishart, supra note 11, at 955.

123. Id
124. Id (citing Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual

Convergence in School FinanceLitigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REv. 301, 311 (2011)).
125. Cf Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 778 (Tex.
2005) ("At one extreme, no one would dispute that a public education system limited to teaching
first-grade reading would be inadequate, or that a system without resources to accomplish its
purposes would be inefficient and unsuitable.").
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inexorably to the instrumental and intrinsic value of an education. This explains
why courts interpret state constitution education clauses that simply mandate the
establishment of a free, public education system 26 to require that the education
provided be of a certain quality.1 27 More often, education clauses employ
adjectives like "suitable," "efficient," "thorough," or some combination
thereof,1 28 which signify that a quality education should be provided.1 29
In a number of states, the education clauses also declare explicitly why a
quality education matters: It is "essential to the preservation of rights and
liberties of the people"1 30 and to a "free,"

131

"good," 132 or "republican form"1 33

34

of government "by the people."1 Several courts have also acknowledged that
education for citizenship is democracy-reinforcing absent such explicit language

126. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("There shall always be free public elementary
and secondary schools in the state. The general assembly shall implement this principle by
appropriate legislation."); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("The legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state
may be educated."); S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3 ("The General Assembly shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a system of free public schools open to all children in the State and
shall establish, organize and support such other public institutions of learning, as may be
desirable.").

127. See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 227
(Conn. 2010) ("[T]he state constitution embodies a substantive component requiring that the public
schools provide their students with an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be
responsible citizens able to participate fully in democratic institutions, such as jury service and
voting, and to prepare them to progress to institutions of higher education, or to attain productive
employment and otherwise to contribute to the state's economy."); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v.

State (Abbeville 1), 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) ("We hold today that the South Carolina
Constitution's education clause requires the General Assembly to provide the opportunity for each
child to receive a minimally adequate education."); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE

1), 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995) ("[The education clause] requires the State to offer all children
the opportunity of a sound basic education . . . consist[ing] of the basic literacy, calculating, and
verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants
capable of voting and serving on a jury.").
128. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6(b) ("The legislature shall make suitable provision for
finance of the educational interests of the state."); KY. CONST. § 183 ("The General Assembly shall,
by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the
State."); W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("The legislature shall provide, by general law, for a thorough
and efficient system of free schools.").

129. See, e.g., Gannon v. State (Gannon 1), 319 P.3d 1196, 1225 (Kan. 2014) (per curiam)
("Simply put, use of 'suitable' necessarily conveys the presence of standards of quality below

which schools may not fall."); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky.
1989) ("[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each and every child

with at least the seven following capacities."); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979)
("We may now define a thorough and efficient system of schools: It develops, as best the state of
education expertise allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare them for
useful and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economically.").
130. See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; Mo. CONST. art. IX, §
1(a); accord MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.

131. See IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII.
132. See MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
133. See IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
134. See N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
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in the state constitution.1 35 Courts have been unequivocal about the importance
of education to the common good-as one put it, the state is "dependent for its
survival on citizens who are able to participate intelligently in the political,
economic, and social functions of our system."1 36 Regarding those economic
functions, a few state constitutions specifically identify "commerce, trades,
manufactures" as well as "vocational," "mining," "agricultural," "scientific,"
and "industrial" improvements as dependent on an educated workforce.1 37
Again, even where state constitutions are not that specific, courts interpreting
them have said that education equips children with the capabilities "to attain
productive employment and otherwise contribute to the state's economy,"1 38 "to
compete favorably"1 39 on the job market, and "lead economically productive
lives to the benefit us all."1 40
State constitutions therefore regard a quality education's "instrumental
value as a public or collective good" that can sustain democracy and a state's
economy.141
"But courts adjudicating the right to education have also
recognized education's intrinsic value as a private, individual good that should
be enhanced by nurturing children's capabilities to be autonomous generally."1 42
They have emphasized that education cultivates "the development of the mind,
body, and social morality (ethics),"1 43 "maturity and understanding,"1 44 "selfknowledge,"1 45 and capacity to "flourish in the twenty-first century."1 46
In addition to being a collective and individual good, education is a
positional good, at least in the competitions that confer the benefits of higher
socioeconomic status, prosperity, and influence (e.g., selective-college
135. See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 812 (Ariz.
1994); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1289 (Conn. 1996); Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649
P.2d 1005, 1017 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (Ga. 1981); Rose, 790
S.W.2d at 206; Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 785-86 (Md. 1983);
McNair v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 288 P. 188, 190 (Mont. 1930); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 1), 303
A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State (CFEl), 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y.
1995); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph 1), 677 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ohio 1997); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter (Mc Wherterl), 851 S.W.2d 139, 150-51 (Tenn. 1993); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State,
585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978); Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877; Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 393
(Vt. 1997) (per curiam).
136. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 1), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993).
137. See MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII; KAN. CONST. art.
VI, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, sec. 1; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
138. Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 253 (Conn. 2010).
139. Pinto v. Ala. Coal. for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894, 896 (Ala. 1995); McDuffy v. Sec'y of
the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremont il), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997).
140. Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 159 (Ala. 1993) (quoting favorably Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982)).
141. See Weishart, supra note 11, at 963.
142. Id.
143. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979).
144. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978).
145. Pinto v. Ala. Coal. for Equity, 662 So. 2d 894, 896 (Ala. 1995); Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
146. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997).
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admissions and high quality jobs). In those competitions, "the instrumental
value of a person's education depends on the quantity and quality of education
she has compared to others. That is, she will be competitive only if her
educational attainment is equivalent to or greater than that of her peers."1 47 It is

for this reason that courts since the first wave have been concerned about the
distribution of educational opportunity as "a major determinant of an
individual's chances for economic and social success in our competitive
society."1 48 "Unequal education," noted the very first high court decision, "leads
to unequal job opportunities, disparate income, and handicapped ability to
participate in the social, cultural, and political activity of our society."1 49
Courts into the second and third waves have remained troubled that
"disadvantaged children will not be able to compete in, and contribute to, the
society entered by the relatively advantaged children" due to educational
inequities.15 0 And so, courts tend to "focus on disparities and seek to ensure
rough comparability" of resources and opportunities,' 5 ' that is, "some kind of
egalitarian commitment [as] necessary to protect children from unfairness in the
competition for postsecondary admission and jobs and from suffering potential
dignitary harms."1 52

State constitutions and judicial interpretations therefore suggest a third,
overriding function of the right to education-to protect children (and thereby
society at large) from the harms of deprivations in educational quality and
disparities in educational opportunity. 15' Admittedly, this inference is not
unavoidable. One reason to provide an equitable and adequate education (and
perform the duty to educate) is because it is morally the right thing to do.1 54 But
that has not been the prevailing justification asserted in state constitution

147. See Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV.
477, 521-22 (2014).
148. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1), 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-56 (Cal. 1971).
149. Id. at 1257.
150. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1), 495 A.2d 376, 390 (N.J. 1985); Hoke Cty. Bd. of
Educ. v. State (Hoke 1), 599 S.E.2d 365, 385 (N.C. 2004) (affirming trial court's conclusion that
schools in rural district "failed to provide graduates with the skills necessary to compete on an equal
basis with others in contemporary society's gainful employment ranks"); DeRolph v. State
(DeRolph 1), 677 N.E.2d 733, 744 (Ohio 1997) ("None of the appellant school districts is financially
able to keep up with the technological training needs of the students in the districts, which makes
it highly unlikely that the children of the appellant school districts will be able to meaningfully
compete in the job market against those students from richer districts who receive a sufficient level
of technological training.").
151. Ryan, supra note 48, at 1237; Michael A. Rebell, Safeguardingthe Right to a Sound
Basic Education in Times of Fiscal Constraint, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1855, 1866 (2012) ("Plaintiffs'
success in these cases has been based on evidence that demonstrated a wide-spread pattern of
inequities and blatant educational inadequacies, primarily affecting low-income and minority
students, in states throughout the country.").
152. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreatfrom Equity in
EducationalLaw and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMoRY L.J. 545, 611 (2006).
153. See Weishart, supra note 11, at 957-58.
154. See id. at 960-61.
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education clauses or among courts construing those clauses.' Alternatively,
one could say that provision and performance remain the essential functions of
the right and entail substantive components (adequacy and equity) because
education is an individual, collective, and positional good.1 56 That alternative
justification is more reflective of state constitutions and judicial interpretations,
but it still begs the question.
What's more, the provision and performance functions do not fully account
for the state's power to infringe children's liberty by compelling them to receive
an adequate and equitable education. 5 7 For that, states "have relied on the
parens patriae doctrine in enacting compulsory-education laws." 5
The
"parenspatriae authority to intercede in the lives of children in order to protect
their safety, promote their education, or otherwise to further their best interests"
is justified by the view that children are not fully autonomous. 159 Parenspatriae
power implies "the duty to protect"1 60 and indeed it has been "defined by many
states as more than just a [power], but also a duty to protect the interests of
children."161 This lesser common law duty has been enveloped by a greater
constitutional duty: If the state has a duty to protect children by educating them,
it has the duty to protect them from the state-sanctioned harms of its compulsory
education.1 62

At bottom, it is a concern about the harms from educational deprivations
and disparities that more completely explains what the right to education is
supposed to do for children protect their equality and liberty interests.1 63
Before evaluating proposed fourth wave remedies in this light, we should
understand the reasons that the remedies of the preceding three waves-equality,
155. Cf Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313-14 (Minn. 1993) ("[O]ur conclusion that
education is a fundamental right is amply supported by other state courts which have interpreted
similar constitutional provisions.") (citing favorably Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71,
91 (Wash. 1978) ("[The education clause] is the Declaration of the State's social, economic and
educational Duty as distinguished from a mere policy or moral Obligation.")).
156. Cf Goodwin Liu, Rethinking ConstitutionalWelfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203, 23233 (2008) ("[C]ourts stand the best chance of harmonizing their recognition of constitutional
welfare rights [e.g., right to education] with latent public morality not by attempting to articulate a
comprehensive theory of our moral beliefs, but by reasoning in a more specific and contingent way
about the distributive norms applicable to particular social goods.").
157. See Weishart, supra note 11, at 970 & nn. 340-41 ("[S]tate compulsory education laws
[] restrict not only children's negative liberties but profoundly shape their positive liberties as
well.").
158. Gregory Thomas, Limitations on Parens Patriae: The State and the Parent/Child
Relationship, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 51, 57 (2007).
159. Anne C. Dailey, Children's ConstitutionalRights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2106-12
(2011).
160. Cf O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975).
161. See Rebecca Williams, Note, Faith Healing Exceptions Versus Parens Patriae:
Something's Gotta Give, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 692, 722 (2012) (citing cases).
162. Cf Liu, supra note 156, at 252-53 ("[I]t would be neither legitimate nor persuasive to
the citizenry for a court to treat education as a protected right absent a backdrop of laws, institutions,
and social understandings against which failures of provision appear conspicuous and irregular.").
163. See Weishart, supra note 11, at 956-59, 962 (contending that the claim-right to an
adequate education functions "to protect liberty in a positive sense freedom to be.").
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equity, and adequacy-have not fully effectuated this protection function.1 64
B. The Remedial Shortcomings of Equality, Equity, and Adequacy
Early first- and second-wave courts generally authorized remedies that
required "either horizontal equity among school districts, such that per-pupil
revenues were roughly equalized by the state, or at leastfiscal neutrality, such
that the revenues available to a school district would not depend solely on the
property wealth of the school district."1 65 These remedies were abandoned,
however, in no small part because leveling up or leveling down educational
spending to achieve absolute fiscal equalization, though possible, was not
sustainable politically.1 66 But the more fatal flaw was that equalization remedies
did not actually protect children from the harms of both deprivations in
educational quality and disparities in educational opportunity:
First, equalizing per pupil funding does not in itself improve the quality of
education; it does not protect against inadequate funding, provided that
inadequacy is equally shared. Second, formal equality fails to address the needs
of disadvantaged children, who enter the schoolhouse door already on unequal
footing. Equalizing per-pupil funding without directly addressing those needs
perpetuated inequalities. Disadvantaged children required not equal but more
spending to even approximate the educational opportunities and attainment of
their peers.1 67

Second- and third- wave courts then gradually came to realize that the

164. It is worth noting here the criticism that "the wave metaphor arguably overstates the
differences between [] adequacy- and equity-based constitutional challenges." Asbury & Woodson,
supra note 65, at 107 n. 104 ("[It] arguably downplays the extent to which adequacy-based cases
actually are grounded in, and in some instances decided upon, measures of equity and equality. [It]
also overstates the chronological ordering of these cases. The earliest adequacy cases predated
many of the equity cases. Further, litigants in some states have continued to bring equity-based
cases long after the rise of adequacy-based constitutional challenges."). "However, if one avoids
the common flaw of assuming a clear line of demarcation between each wave and accepts that each
case may draw from theories dominant in one or more waves alternatively, then the metaphor
remains useful as an explanatory tool." Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 705, 726 (2012).
165. William S. Koski & Jesse Hahnel, The Past, Present, and Possible Futures of
Educational Finance Reform Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE
AND POLICY 41, 46 (Helen F. Ladd & Margaret E. Goertz eds., 2d ed. 2015) (emphasis added).
166. See Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics ofSchool Finance in the 1990s,
in EQUITY & ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES & PERSPECTIVES 136, 138 (Helen F.
Ladd et al. eds., 1999) ("No proposal to equalize education funding throughout a state by decreasing
expenditures down to the lowest level has ever been considered politically feasible."); Richard
Briffault, Our Localism: PartI The Structure ofLocal Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
61 (1990) ("Limited state fiscal capacities and resistance to increased state taxes constrain the scope
of equalization programs, so that most equalization assistance serves not to equalize but to raise the
level of spending in poorer districts to some target amount usually at or below the median
spending level in the state, and certainly not up to the spending of the more affluent districts. The
'levelling up' component of state school aid thus tends to level to the middle.").
167. Joshua E. Weishart, Equal Liberty in Proportion, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215, 228
(2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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remedy should "direct more compensatory resources and services to the neediest
students to mitigate their disadvantages and progress vertical equity."168 This
shift from horizontal to vertical equity began with courts granting that "absolute
equality or precisely equal advantages are not required" and that "a state may
recognize differences in educational costs based on relevant economic and
educational factors." 69 Consequently, "differences in area costs as well as
qualities of students may result in different levels of spending" and
"disadvantaged students [likely will] require above-average access to education
resources."1 7 0 Instead of "treating all children identically," vertical equity
demanded "treating differently situated children as equals according to their
needs."'7 ' Several courts endorsed this shift from formal equality of educational
opportunity to "substantialequality of educational opportunity."1 72

168. Id. at 229 ("Such remedial measures are most often implemented through weighted
student funding formulas, which assign weights to all students . . but apportion additional weights
to certain student demographic categories that have more expensive educational needs . . .which is
supposed to result in schools with higher populations of these student categories receiving more
state funding.").
169. Horton v. Meskill (Horton1), 376 A.2d 359, 376 (Conn. 1977); see also Opinion of the
Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 115 (Ala. 1993) ("Equal educational opportunities need not necessarily
be strictly equal or precisely uniform... schoolchildren who have different educational
circumstances, needs and aptitudes may require different school resources and facilities which, in
turn, may entail different costs. This may be most obvious in the case of children with disabilities
and children otherwise disadvantaged."); Gannon v. State (Gannon 1), 319 P.3d 1196, 1239 (Kan.
2014) ("Simply put, equity need not meet precise equality standards."); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d
384, 397 (Vt. 1997) ("[W]e emphasize that absolute equality of funding is neither a necessary nor
a practical requirement to satisfy the constitutional command of equal educational opportunity.");
Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 336 (Wyo. 1980) ("[W]e wish to
make clear that we are not suggesting that each school district receive exactly the same number of
dollars per pupil as every other school district.... A state formula can be devised which will weigh
the calculation to compensate for special needs educational cost differentials.").
170. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1), 495 A.2d 376, 388 (N.J. 1985); see also Montoy v. State,
102 P.3d 1160, 1164 (Kan. 2005) (concluding that school "financing formula was not based upon
actual costs to educate children" of different needs and "distorted the low enrollment, special
education, vocational, bilingual education, and the at-risk student weighting factors"); Hoke Cty.
Bd. ofEduc. v. State (Hoke 1), 599 S.E.2d 365, 393 (N.C. 2004) (affirming trial court's finding that
at-risk students were not receiving the remedial aid necessary to "avail themselves of [an]
educational opportunity"); State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. (Campbellll), 19 P.3d 518, 547 (Wyo.
2001) ("We hold the adjustments for funding EDY [economically disadvantaged youth] and LES
[English speaking] students result in disparities in funding which are not justified by any
compelling state interest and which do not reflect the cost of adequately educating these students.
The state is directed to fund the actual and necessary costs of EDY and LES students").
171. Weishart, supra note 167, at 236-37.
172. Brigham, 692 A.2d at 397; see also Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d at 115 ("Thus,
the Court, in reviewing the evidence, has focused its inquiry broadly on the issue of substantial
equity and fairness in the way the state's system of public schools allocates educational opportunity
to its students."); Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View Ill), 91 S.W.3d 472, 500
(Ark. 2002) ("Equality of educational opportunity must include as basic components substantially
equal curricula, substantially equal facilities, and substantially equal equipment for obtaining an
adequate education."); Horton 1, 376 A.2d at 375 ("[State must] provide a substantially equal
educational opportunity to its youth in its free public elementary and secondary schools");
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) ("efficient" system
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Although remedial measures incorporating vertical equity principles could
better mitigate the harms of disparities in educational opportunity, they did not
necessarily protect children from deprivations in educational quality. Cue the
third-wave adequacy lawsuit. It seized on the standards-based reform movement
of the 1980s and the general reluctance of state governments to achieve more
equitable school funding formulas.1 73 "Rather than demand equalization of tax
capacity or expenditures across school districts, adequacy only required that
each school district have enough funding so that all of its students could achieve
a minimum qualitative threshold."1 74 Wealthy, politically powerful school
districts would be permitted to spend above that threshold. '7 5 Adequacy was
thus thought to be "the more achievable, but more modest" remedial alternative
to equity.1 76 And indeed courts have been more receptive: plaintiffs prevailed in
approximately 75% of adequacy cases from 1989 to 2006.177 It was also during
this third wave, however, that courts in six states surrendered, deciding that they
could not decide adequacy cases due to separation of powers concerns.178 Those
concerns eventually festered into other states, prompting courts once willing to
advance into battle to retreat in quick succession. It turned out that adequacy was
less achievable and modest to enforce as a remedy than it was initially billed.
To be sure, there were doubts about justiciability from the outset, but
specific remedial concerns were not at the forefront in the first liability phase of
adequacy litigation. Courts were then tasked preliminarily with deciding
whether their state constitution education clauses entailed adequacy as a
distributive principle demanding a minimum threshold of educational quality.
guarantees "substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort"
so that students are "afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have access to educational
funds"); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter (McWherter 1), 851 S.W.2d 139, 140-41 (Tenn.
1993) ("The constitution, . . imposes upon the General Assembly the obligation to maintain and
support a system of free public schools that affords substantially equal educational opportunities to
all students."); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 865 (W. Va. 1979) ("Equal protection, applied to
education, must mean an equality in substantive educational offerings and results, no matter what
the expenditure may be.").
173. Weishart, supra note 167, at 236.
174. Id. at 236-37. More than forty states have adopted "some version of foundation
funding" whereby the state obligates "local school districts to levy taxes at a rate [] aimed at
generating enough revenue to fund a minimum education, with the state supplementing the amount
actually raised by poor districts when the required rate did not yield the minimum 'foundation
level."' See Rebell, supra note 152, at 1965-66. But most of these states "substantially
compromise the foundation concept by creating a limited foundation category that does not cover
all basic adequacy needs, adding to the formula a confusing array of categorical funding streams
and additional formula programs, and then failing to fund the formula at an adequate level." Id at
1966.
175. Weishart, supra note 167, at 237.
176. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School FinanceReform, 48
VAND. L. REv. 101, 182 (1995); see also Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance
Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1151, 1168-76
(1995) (discussing the factors prompting the shift from equity to adequacy).
177. See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1467, 1483 n.73 (2007).
178. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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Most had little trouble reaching that conclusion,1 79 even though some were
reluctant to define an adequate education, assigning that work, in the first
instance, to the legislative and executive branches. 80 When those branches have
dragged their feet, however, "courts have ultimately taken it upon themselves to
define adequacy and set the constitutional standard."' 8' But most courts left it
to their legislatures to devise the remedial scheme and afforded them
"substantial deference" in doing SO.1 82 As that duty went unfulfilled and
plaintiffs came back to court to complain, judicial enforcement became a bit
more challenging.
In this initial remedial phase of adequacy litigation, courts have employed
"a variety of remedial schemes ranging from simply 'vetoing' the legislature's
operative finance plan and sending it back to the drawing board, to ordering that
an expert consultant be retained to 'cost out' what would be an adequate
education."1 83 When states still failed to comply, judicial enforcement of the
adequacy remedy went from challenging to daunting. In the ensuing remedial
and contempt phases, plaintiffs have returned to court demanding what they
perceived to be the clear import of prior orders, i.e., more money for schools.
Plaintiffs thus "focused more and more on levels of funding as the measure of
adequacy in education, often to the exclusion of other elements that might be
less tangible but more easily approached by courts."1 84 In some cases, plaintiffs
were armed with those costing-out studies that further quantified adequacy but
also nudged courts "firmly into the legislative territory of appropriations,"
reinforcing the notion that adequacy is "about funding and nothing more." 8 5
State defendants have responded by challenging the cost-out study

179. In fact, many of the courts that surrendered also conceded as much before declining to
entertain the merits of the claim. See id.
180. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee (Lake View Ill), 91 S.W.3d 472, 487
(Ark. 2002) ("[T]he General Assembly is well on the way to defining adequacy while the
Department of Education, from all indications, has been recalcitrant."); Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor (Claremont l), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993) ("We do not define the parameters of
the education mandated by the constitution as that task is, in the first instance, for the legislature
and the Governor."); Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 261 (Mont.
2005) ("Because the Constitution mandates that the Legislature provide a quality education, we
determine that the Legislature can best construct a 'quality' system of education if it first defines
what is a 'quality' system of education.").
181. Weishart, supra note 167, at 238 ("[S]ome states either adopted the seven capabilities
from Rose or have specified others. Even in states where courts have declined to list a particular set
of capabilities, courts have defined the standard broadly to emphasize that an adequate education
must enable children to be responsible citizens, productive members of the economy, or
autonomous individuals.") (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 263.
183. Koski & Reich, supra note 152, at 565 (observing that middle range remedies have
included "specific directive[s] that the state provide a certain type of educational programming for
certain children and schools (an inputs standard)," and alternatively "order[s] that the state shall
ensure that students achieve a certain outcome without dictating the specific inputs (an outcomes
standard)").
184. Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 6, at 104.
185. Id. at 109.
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methodology or with their own experts questioning whether increased funding
can actually improve educational outcomes, that is, whether money even
matters.1 86 Defendants also point to any increase in funding as falling "near, or
within, the spectrum of plausible [adequacy] standards" to support their
argument that courts should not be "substituting their own judgment for that of
the legislature on issues that push against the bounds of the separation of
powers."

87

Courts wading through all of this in successive remedial and contempt
phases of adequacy litigation frequently choose the path of least resistanceretreat or at least cease to advance. A majority of courts confronted with
increasingly-recalcitrant legislatures either (1) refuse "to evaluate
appropriations, the heart of the legislature's domain," and thus deny plaintiffs
relief,188 (2) continue to declare the financing system unconstitutional without
issuing further remedial guidance,1 89 or (3) approve school funding schemes as
"reasonably calculated" to achieve a constitutionally adequate education in
deference to legislative prerogatives, despite persistent educational deprivations
and disparities.1 90
As a result, "between 2008 and 2012, plaintiffs lost about two-thirds of the
time in high courts [and], notwithstanding the end of the recession, the trend has
not substantially improved since 2012."191 Meanwhile, states cut education
budgets "in excess of what was necessary and maintained most of [those cuts]
after tax revenues returned to pre-recession levels," in some states "a full 20
percent or more below the pre-recession levels."1 92 It is little wonder then that
so much of the scholarly commentary on the third wave has been consumed with
whether adequacy can overcome justiciability concerns that hinder enforcement.
There is nevertheless a more profound problem with adequacy as a remedy
for violations of the state constitutional right to education. Adequacy alone
cannot effectuate the right's function to protect children from the harms of both
deprivations in educational quality and disparities in educational opportunity.
This is the more fatal flaw just as it was for the early first- and second-wave
equalization remedies.
Regarding deprivations in educational quality-the primary target of the
93
adequacy remedy the problem "has been delineating the quality standards."1
Courts have defined adequacy qualitative goals, at least in broad terms, but they

186. See id. at 106-13.
187. Id. at 103.
188. Id. at 104.
189. Id. at 88-89, 100 (contending such "empty formalism" permits the legislature to "simply
continue making its own best effort at improvement, even if that effort falls far short of a
constitutional minimum").
190. Weishart, supra note 167, at 237.
191. See Black, supra note 30, at 451 ("Since the recession, plaintiffs have suffered complete
or substantial losses before the highest courts in six states.").
192. Derek W. Black, Abandoning the Federal Role in Education: The Every Student
Succeeds Act, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1345-46 (2017).
193. Weishart, supra note 167, at 237.
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have not required further standard setting as to "the skills, competencies, and
knowledge necessary to serve those goals of an adequate education, as the
unraveling of the Common Core suggests." 94 Legislative resistance to funding
even the generally low-to-moderate adequacy thresholds has also deterred courts
from setting their sights higher, which might be necessary "to diminish any
positional advantages" in the competition for postsecondary education and
employment or to maintain equal citizenship.1 95 Although several courts have
recognized that the educational quality standards must evolve,1 96 not enough
have insisted through subsequent enforcements that the remedy actually "be
relational and dynamic because what it takes to be an equal citizen-that is,
where to set the adequacy threshold invariably turns on what educational
resources others have." 97 Without this relational or comparative component

194. See Koski, supra note 46, at 1908; see also Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont

VII), 794 A.2d 744, 751-52 (N.H. 2002) ("[Definition of an adequate education] must have
standards, and the standards must be subject to meaningful application so that it is possible to
determine whether, in delegating its obligations to provide a constitutionally adequate education,
the State has fulfilled its duty.").
195. See Weishart, supra note 147, at 527, 535; see also David Hinojosa & Karolina Walters,
How Adequacy LitigationFails to Fulfill the Promise ofBrown (But How It Can Get Us Closer),
2014 MICH. ST. L. REv. 575, 581 (2014) ("If courts continue to apply the lowest level of academic
achievement when defining an "adequate education," [they] will essentially gut the constitutional
rights at stake and render them meaningless.").
196. See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 255
(Conn. 2010) ("The broad constitutional standard also reflects our recognition of the fact that the
specific educational inputs or instrumentalities suitable to achieve this minimum level of education
may well change over time."); Montoy, 120 P.3d 306, 309 (Kan. 2005) ("The Kansas Constitution
thus imposes a mandate that our educational system cannot be static or regressive but must be one
which "advance[s] to a better quality or state."); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Educ.,
615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993) ("The content of the duty to educate which the Constitution
places on the Commonwealth necessarily will evolve together with our society."); Claremont Sch.
Dist. v. Governor (ClaremontH1), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) ("A constitutionally adequate
public education is not a static concept removed from the demands of an evolving world.");
DeRolph v. State (DeRolph Il), 728 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (Ohio 2000) ("The definition of 'thorough
and efficient' is not static; it depends on one's frame of reference."); McCleary v. State (McCleary
1), 269 P.3d 227, 251 (Wash. 2012) ("The legislature has an obligation to review the basic education
program as the needs of students and the demands of society evolve"); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978) ("We must Interpret the constitution in accordance with the
demands of modern society or it will be in constant danger of becoming atrophied and, in fact, may
even lose its original meaning."); State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. (Campbell ll), 19 P.3d 518, 561
(Wyo. 2001) ("The state must assure that over time appropriate local enhancements are adopted as
state required facilities as the standards for an adequate education evolve.").
197. See Weishart, supra note 147, at 527; accord Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson II), 355 A.2d
129, 133 (N.J. 1976) ("[W]hat seems sufficient today may be proved inadequate tomorrow, and
even more importantly that only in the light of experience can one ever come to know whether a
particular program is achieving the desired end."); Montoy, 120 P.3d at 309 ("The Kansas
Constitution thus imposes a mandate that our educational system cannot be static or regressive but
must be one which "advance[s] to a better quality or state."); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 555 ("The
content of the duty to educate which the Constitution places on the Commonwealth necessarily
will evolve together with our society."); Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1359 ("A constitutionally
adequate public education is not a static concept removed from the demands of an evolving
world."); DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (Ohio 2000) ("The definition of 'thorough and

2018

WEISHART: EDUCATION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

371

informing the standards, adequacy cannot fully remedy the harms of
deprivations in educational quality.' 98
Similarly, adequacy as a remedy can only partially mitigate the harms of
disparities in educational opportunity for those children below the adequacy
threshold. "For if adequacy requires getting all students above a certain
threshold, it will tend to focus disproportionate resources on disadvantaged
students so that they can actually meet that threshold."1 99 And indeed adequacy
court decisions have at times authorized remedies "to compensate for differences
in regional costs and student needs that translate into higher costs to supply the
same quality of education throughout the state."200 In theory then, if not in
practice, "adequacy is vertical equity by a different name," at least concerning
below-threshold educational disparities. 201 The most practical and immediate
way to employ vertical equity-type "needs-based" assessments is "in the
methods used in costing-out an adequate education." 202 The trouble has been
that "courts have not uniformly embraced and ordered concepts of vertical
equity to be included in adequacy cost studies and legislatures have done so only
rarely." 203

Although the potential exists to mitigate disparities below the threshold,
adequacy in its extreme does not demand any remedial measures be taken to
address above-threshold educational disparities.
In theory, adequacy
presumptively denies the moral significance of above-threshold disparities
because its egalitarian aim is "to assure not that children have the same
educational resources and opportunities, but that all children have enough to
avoid oppression and function as equal citizens."204 In practice, however, courts
efficient' is not static; it depends on one's frame of reference."); McCleary 1, 269 P.3d at 251 ("The
legislature has an obligation to review the basic education program as the needs of students and the
demands of society evolve"); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 94 ("We must Interpret the
constitution in accordance with the demands of modern society or it will be in constant danger of
becoming atrophied and, in fact, may even lose its original meaning."); CampbellH1, 19 P.3d at 561
("The state must assure that over time appropriate local enhancements are adopted as state required
facilities as the standards for an adequate education evolve.").
198. See Koski & Reich, supra note 152, at 562-63 ("[N]one of [the adequacy] standards
necessarily specifically targets poor or minority children, nor distributes educational resources on
a basis that compares under-resourced schools to their privileged peers, nor seeks as a matter of
principle to reduce resource inequality gaps between the well off and the poor.").
199. Weishart, supra note 167, at 239.
200. Regina R. Umpstead, Determining Adequacy: How Courts Are Redefining State
Responsibilityfor EducationalFinance, Goals, andAccountability, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 28 1,
298 (2007).
201. Weishart, supra note 167, at 239.
202. William S. Koski, Achieving "Adequacy " in the Classroom, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
13, 21-23 (2007). For instance, costing-out studies can price "additional resources for remedial
reading programs and free breakfast and lunch for low-income children, English remediation for
ELLs, and mandatory preschool and all-day kindergarten for children in low-income school
district." Id. at 23.
203. Koski & Reich, supra note 152, at 568-69 ("Most importantly, even such targeted
remedial schemes do not compare the resources of poor children to those of the affluent, and
therefore they cannot achieve true vertical equity.").
204. Weishart, supra note 167, at 239-40.
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have not always enforced this extreme form of adequacy with a few inclined to
tolerate above-threshold disparities "until they undermine the ability of students
to function as equal citizens and compete for admission for higher education and
high-quality jobs on comparable terms."205 Again, that calls for a vertical
equity-type assessment but "the trouble has been that courts have not uniformly
insisted that adequacy and vertical equity be mutually reinforcing [in this way]
nor have they consistently demanded evidence (cost studies or other empirical
findings) from which they could make that assessment." 206
In sum, the adequacy remedy cannot effectuate the right to education's
function to protect children's equality and liberty interests without incorporating
the relational and comparative elements grounded in vertical equity remedial
measures, which most courts and legislatures have not applied to a sufficient
degree.
C. Protecting Equal Liberty
What does all of this portend for fourth-wave remedies? When the remedy
has not effectuated the right to education's protection function, it has proved
unsuccessful. That correlation, of course, does not imply causation; other factors
better explain these shortcomings when the remedy has been deemed
practically infeasible, politically unsustainable, or potentially nonjusticiable. It
is evident that past education rights litigation, "as a species of public law
litigation, faces particular remedial problems that are not present in the typical
private suit that seeks damages or negative injunctive relief." 207 Then again, the
lack of complete success has not meant a remedy's complete failure. Horizontal
equity, vertical equity, and adequacy have each left their mark. Both the virtues
and vices of these remedies have affected the right to education's "content and
scope." 208 The downfall of horizontal equity, for instance, expanded the right's
scope beyond formal equality of educational
opportunity (i.e.,
nondiscrimination). The early success of adequacy supplemented the right's
content with the adoption of qualitative educational thresholds. But while these
remedies have affected the right's content and scope, they have not
fundamentally altered its protection function.
In fashioning remedies for the "next generation" of education rights cases,
courts and advocates should be mindful of that protection function not because
it will guarantee a remedy's complete success but because, when that function
is effectuated, it animates the principles inhering in the right, and thereby, the
205. Id at 240; see Ryan, supra note 48, at 1237; Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee
(Lake View Ill), 91 S.W.3d 472, 496 (Ark. 2002) ("[Disparities] can sustain a finding of inadequacy
but also, when compared to other schools in other districts, a finding of inequality."); Helena Elem.
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989) ("[D]iscrepancies in spending as large as
the ones present in Montana translate.. into unequal educational opportunities").
206. Weishart, supra note 167, at 291.
207. See Molly Townes O'Brien, At the Intersection ofPublic Policy and Private Process:
Court OrderedMediation and the Remedial Process in School FundingLitigation, 18 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 391, 401 (2003).
208. See Weishart, supra note 11, at 944 n.174.
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will of the people. 209 That might assure just enough collective buy-in to
guarantee a remedy's endurance.210
The other lesson for the would-be fourth wave is that it will take both
vertical equity and adequacy to mitigate the harms of educational deprivations
and disparities. "Whether or not that fourth wave ever surfaces, there has been
a strong undercurrent drifting a few courts toward both adequacy and vertical
equity." 2 1' That undercurrent has not developed into its own wave because
"courts have tended to analyze vertical equity and adequacy separately, treating
them as distinct claims or remedies [and thus] have not established standards for
mutually enforcing these reciprocal demands."2 12 Courts should instead own
what their decisions have already begun to operationalize: Vertical equity and
adequacy converge to constitute a claim for "a more robust, integral equal liberty
that demands treating differently situated children as equals according to their
needs, so as to cultivate, through state action, children's positive freedoms to
become equal citizens."213 The claim for equal liberty under the state
constitutional right to education can be delineated as follows:
The claim is for adequately equal educational opportunities aimed at
ensuring approximately, not strictly, equal chances for educational
success-achieved through vertical rather than horizontal equity. This
form of equality is conducive to the positive and negative demands of
liberty. The claim is also one for an equally adequate education in
that all children should have access to a quality education-achieved
through high adequacy thresholds sensitive to children's capabilities

209. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) ("The government of the United States
has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right."); Gannon v. State (GannonII), 368 P.3d 1024, 1057 (Kan. 2016) ("The Constitution is the
work of the people-it declares their will and those who would disobey its provisions, instead of
disobeying the people, are in fact disregarding and defying their will."); see also Paul Gerwitz,
Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983) ("The function of a remedy is to 'realize'
a legal norm, to make it a 'living truth."'); Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The
ConstitutionAs A Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1551 (1972) ("[T]he court must first determine
that the implicated constitutional provision provides substantive protection to one in the position
of the plaintiff The focus should then be upon whether there are other remedies available to those
in the plaintiff s position that would as fully effectuate the purposes of the constitutional guarantee
as the remedy sought.").
210. Levy, supra note 4, at 1091 ("[T]he effectiveness ofjudicial remedies in school finance
cases may have more to do with the willingness of those involved to seek cooperative solutions
than with the particular form of the remedy."); see also Evans v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 126, 171
(D.D.C. 2010) ("[A]t a minimum, a 'durable' remedy means a remedy that gives the Court
confidence that defendants will not resume their violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights once
judicial oversight ends."); Jason Parkin, Aging Injunctions andthe Legacy ofInstitutionalReform
Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 167, 219 (2017) ("Institutional reform litigation cannot succeed
unless its remedies are both durable and adaptable. That is, the resulting injunctions must remain
in place long enough to prompt meaningful systemic reform, and they must be flexible enough to
account for changing facts and circumstances.").
211. Weishart, supra note 167, at 266-67 (citing cases).
212. Id. at 268.
213. Id. at 224.
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positive liberties to function as equal citizens and to compete for
admission to higher education and for high-quality jobs. This positive
form of liberty is equality enhancing, fostering a relational, democratic
equality through equal citizenship.2 14
It may be asking state supreme courts too much to adhere to principles they
were among the first to espouse, ahead of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent equal
liberty jurisprudence. But it will make little difference for state courts to overtly
endorse the convergence of vertical equity and adequacy if they remain
disinclined to mutually enforce them at the remedial phase of the litigation.
Remedial standards are therefore needed not just to effectuate the right's
protection function but to instill confidence in judges that they can fulfill their
constitutional role in authorizing remedies without treading on the powers of the
other coordinate branches.
III. REASONABLY CONGRUENT AND DIREcTL Y PROPORTIONAL

If "there is nothing new under the sun," then crafting remedial standards
for the state constitutional right to education need not begin on a blank slate.215
Indeed, an accessible, albeit imperfect, standard already regulates another
affirmative, legislative duty to enforce substantive constitutional guarantees. It
is a standard that bears particular relevance because it was designed to preclude
remedies that breach separation of powers. Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment216 confers "a positive grant of legislative power to Congress," the
scope of which is "broad." 217 "It is for the Congress in the first instance to
determine whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its conclusions are entitled to much deference."2 18
This broad grant of power, however, "is not unlimited." 219
In keeping with separation of powers, Congress has the power "to enforce"
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment but not "the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation." 220 Courts reserve the power to
determine the "substance" and "meaning" of constitutional rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 221 Because "the line between measures that remedy or
prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in
the governing law is not easy to discern," courts apply the following remedial
standard: "There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." 222
214. Id at 241 (quotations, alteration, and citation omitted).
215. Ecclesiastes 1:9 ("What has been will be again, what has been done will be done
again.").
216. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].").
217. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997).
218. Id at 536.
219. Id at 518.
220. Id at 519.
221. Id
222. Id at 519-20.
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Congress's Section 5 enforcement power initially seems an odd federal
analog to the state constitutional right to education. Though enumerated,
Congress's enforcement power is bounded by the congruence and
proportionality standard, whereas most state constitutions grant the legislature
plenary power over education.223 This difference, in enumerated versus plenary
power, affects judicial review in other contexts.224 Federal courts generally are
disinclined to afford great deference to Congress, fearing an "erosion of the
concept of a national government of limited and enumerated powers."225 State
courts, by contrast, take a more "deferential attitude" on "the theory of plenary
power" which they generally understand "as a mandate to defer to legislative
judgments."226
The other significant structural difference is, of course, federalism which
narrows the relief available in federal constitutional cases but "holds no purchase
when a state court seeks to enforce a state constitutional right against a state
official."227 Beyond the structural differences, some might question the
reliability of the ambiguous congruence and proportionality standard, which has
been susceptible to misapplication 228 and has often been hijacked "to protect
federalism values" more so than separation of powers.229 Others might also
question the wisdom of relying on a remedial standard employed in "a series of
cases that invalidated or limited the application of civil rights statutes."2 3 0

223. See Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional
Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (1992) ("All but eight state constitutions appear to grant the
legislature this plenary authority over education.").
224. See Robert A. Schapiro, JudicialDeference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and
Federal ConstitutionalLaw, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 716 (2000) ("Although the standard of
judicial review likely reflects many influences, the pattern of deference in the federal and state
courts corresponds to judicial understandings of the fundamental postulates of state and federal
constitutions.").
225. See id at 669; accord Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516 ("Under our Constitution, the Federal
Government is one of enumerated powers. . . . The judicial authority to determine the
constitutionality of laws, in cases and controversies, is based on the premise that the 'powers of the
legislature are defined and limited."').
226. See Schapiro, supra note 224, at 669; accord Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W.
Va. 1979) ("And we emphasize that great weight will be given to legislatively established
standards, because the people have reposed in that department of government 'plenary, if not
absolute' authority and responsibility for the school system."); see William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa.
Dep't of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 441 (Pa. 2017) ("[T]his Court assumed a deferential posture toward
the General Assembly's efforts, reflecting the judicial restraint ostensibly necessary to preserve
free legislative development of education policy.").
227. See Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional SocioEconomic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 923, 977 (2011).
228. See Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate"Means-Ends Constraintson Section 5 Powers,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1133 (2001); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 746 (1998); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal
Protection by Law: FederalAntidiscriminationLegislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE
L.J. 441, 458 (2000).
229. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalismand Section Five Power:
PolicentricInterpretationofthe Family andMedical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2050 (2003).
230. See Kenji Yoshino, The New EqualProtection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 771 (2011).
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The point of comparison is not to diminish these differences and concerns
but to account for them in casting new remedial standards tailored to the state
constitutional right to education. 231 A semblance of that right appears in
Congress's Section 5 enforcement power which corresponds with an affirmative
"duty of legislative rationality in construing the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive guarantees [of equal protection, due process, and citizenship] and in
choosing the means to effectuate those guarantees."232 Broadly, equality,
liberty, and citizenship are the very same guarantees of the state constitutional
right to education.233 To be sure, state courts have construed the guarantees
under that right more expansively than federal courts have construed equal
protection and due process guarantees. But "many fundamental principles,
consistent with their origins and evolution in state constitutions, are today
properly and actually understood as transcendent American principles."2 34 And
when it comes to interpreting substantive guarantees, "general separation of
powers principles [motivating the congruence and proportionality standard] are
relatively uncontroversial." 235
"In the case law that now constitutes our story of constitutionalism, we have
embraced, first, the necessity ofjudicial review[, second,] the practice ofjudicial
supremacy of constitutional interpretation[, and third,] that judicial
interpretation should be exclusive."236

231. See Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 227, at 969 ("We argue that [federal remedial]
doctrines . . are irrelevant to state court litigation-or, at the least, ought to be significantly adapted
to account for the different institutional position of the state systems.").
232. See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330,
400 (2006) (situating a substantive right to "a meaningful floor of educational opportunity" in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause which Congress is duty bound to enforce).
233. See Weishart, supra note 167, at 241.
234. Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights: A
Reappraisal,92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1328 (2017) ("[S]tate constitutionalism must therefore rest
on a justification for redundancy between state and federal courts in interpreting unitary
constitutional principles."); see id at 1312-13 ("This redundancy in interpretive authoritywhereby state courts and federal courts independently construe the guarantees that their respective
constitutions have in common-is one important way that our system of government channels
disagreement in our diverse democracy. The legitimacy of state constitutionalism mainly turns on
a proper understanding of the structure of our federal system, not on questions of interpretive
methodology.").
235. See William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the
Badges andIncidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1379, n.139 (2007).
236. Robin West, Tom Paine's Constitution, 89 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1433-34 (2003); accord
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
law of the Constitution."). Notable dissenters argue that interpretative authority should be shared
among the judiciary and legislative branches, see Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions
andInterpretation:A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 171 (1997), or
all three branches, see, e.g., James F. Fleming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy:
Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2005).
Others argue for legislative, not judicial, supremacy. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 230, 268-82 (2006).
And still others emphasize that ultimate interpretative authority resides principally with the people.
See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181-82 (1999). But
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Judicial supremacy does not always reign supreme in the states. The
"features of state practice-the mutability of constitutional text, the prevalence
of direct democracy, and the frequency of legislative and popular reversal of
judicial interpretations-"undercut judicial supremacy in practice.237 Yet these
features have not undercut judicial exclusivity, at least not among the majority
of state high courts that have interpreted and given effect to their state
constitution education clauses. 238 These courts appear to understand that they
"possess interpretive responsibility to articulate the scope and nature of the
constitution's meaning, even if the other branches possess initial remedial
responsibility to effectuate a constitutional duty." 239 The essential point here is

'

that, although there are "a variety of significant differences between the work of
the state courts and the work of the federal courts [regarding separation of
powers],"240 state courts respect the margins set by the congruence and
proportionality standard.24
"In all fairness," that standard "is neutral in itself [and] can be good or evil,
depending on the use that is made of it."

242

With one exception, "no Justice has

criticized or rejected the principle of congruence and proportionality per se," 243
even as several have disagreed with its application and have indicated they
by and large those arguments have not carried the day.
237. David E. Pozen, JudicialElectionsAs Popular Constitutionalism,110 COLUM. L. REV.
2047, 2090-91 (2010).
238. See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1276 (Conn. 1996) ("[W]e are persuaded that
the phrase 'appropriate legislation' . . . does not deprive the courts of the authority to determine
what is 'appropriate."'); Gannon v. State (Gannon 1), 319 P.3d 1196, 1230 (Kan. 2014) ("As this
court said after 9 years of statehood, [i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.") (citation and quotation marks omitted); William Penn Sch.
Dist. v. Pa. Dep't of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 436 (Pa. 2017) ("The foundation for the rule of law as
we have come to know it is the axiom that, when disagreements arise, the Court has the final word
regarding the Constitution's meaning."); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 83-84
(Wash. 1978) ("Both history and uncontradicted authority make clear that [i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is even when that interpretation
serves as a check on the activities of another branch or is contrary to the view of the
constitution taken by another branch.") (citations and quotation marks omitted).
239. Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 227, at 956; see Bauries, supra note 16, at 745
(pertaining as to whether or not the state constitution includes an explicit separation of powers
provision, which "does not have any discernable impact on whether courts choose to abstain from
the merits of constitutional litigation on the very grounds of separation of powers").
240. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm:Separation of Powers in
State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1548 (1997); see also Sonja Ralston Elder, Note, Standing
Up to Legislative Bullies: Separation ofPowers, State Courts, and EducationalRights, 57 DUKE
L.J. 755, 759 (2007).
241. See Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights
Claims: The Role of State Courts in Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057, 1067
(1993) ("Consistent with Marbury, the states entrust constitutional interpretation to the branch most
suited, the judiciary.").
242. Elisabeth Zoller, Congruence and Proportionality for Congressional Enforcement
Powers: Cosmetic Change or Velvet Revolution?, 78 IND. L.J. 567, 570 (2003) (emphasis added).
243. Id. But see Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557-58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing congruence and proportionality as an "invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policydriven decisionmaking").
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would prefer a more deferential standard.244 Critics nevertheless rightfully
charge that the congruence and proportionality standard is "a wolf in sheep's
clothing."245 The Court has essentially overplayed its hand with this standard
"in an effort to protect its position as the primary interpreter of the Constitution,
as well as to protect the federalism-based claims of autonomy asserted by the
states, [it] crafted a doctrine that undermines most of Congress's efforts to play
a meaningful role in the enforcement of civil rights."246
Seemingly more concerned with policing federalism than separation of
powers,247 the Court superimposed on the congruence and proportionality
standard a heavy evidentiary burden on Congress to make "specific factual
findings of a relevant history and pattern of constitutional violations." 248
Compounding that problem, the Court has used the guise of congruence and
proportionality to invalidate legislation when Congress, in fact, assembled a
comprehensive record of constitutional violations. 249 And even when the Court
has deemed the congressional record sufficient, it has rigorously applied the
congruence and proportionality "tailoring" requirement in a way that "parses the
legislation at issue and compares it, on a provision-by-provision basis, with the
judicial standard for the underlying constitutional right that Congress sought to
protect." 250

Ironically, as a result of all of this second-guessing of Congress to protect
federalism values, the Court has created a different set of separation of powers

244. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 388 (2001) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("The Court, through its evidentiary demands, its non-deferential review, and its
failure to distinguish between judicial and legislative constitutional competencies, improperly
invades a power that the Constitution assigns to Congress.").
245. See Caminker, supra note 228, at 1132-33.
246. See Tiffany C. Graham, Rethinking Section Five: Deference, Direct Regulation, and
Restoring CongressionalAuthority to Enforce the FourteenthAmendment, 65 RUTGERS L. REV.
667, 669 (2013).
247. See Post & Siegel, supra note 229, at 2050.
248. Carter, supra note 235, at 1379 n.139 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Lane, 541
U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting this obligates the Court to "regularly check
Congress's homework to make sure that [Congress] has identified sufficient constitutional
violations to make its remedy congruent and proportional")). But see Simon Lazarus, Strippingthe
Gears ofNational Government: Justice Stevens's StandAgainst JudicialSubversion ofProgressive
Laws and Lawmaking, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 769, 804 (2012) (contending that "Justice Stevens's
opinion [in Lane] reduced the evidentiary hurdles that Congress must meet under that framework
so that they do not obviously differ materially from traditional 'rational basis' deference in
Necessary and Proper Clause precedents").
249. See Y. Frank Ren, Note, Fixing Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power: An
Argument for A Rebuttable Presumption in Favor of CongressionalAbrogation of State Sovereign
Immunity, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1459, 1471 (2014); see also Pratik A. Shah, Saving Section 5: Lessons
from Consent Decrees and Ex Parte Young, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1001, 1055 (2005). The
Court has "discounted statements from members of Congress describing the extent of
discrimination against the aged, disabled, and women" or "dismissed as irrelevant state reports of
a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination against these groups." Bertrall L. Ross II, Democracy
and Renewed Distrust: Equal Protection and the Evolving Judicial Conception of Politics, 101
CAL. L. REV. 1565, 1627-28 (2013).
250. See Shah, supra note 249, at 1054-55.
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concerns than those the congruence and proportionality standard was meant to
address. 25
Again, however, the trouble is not with congruence and proportionality per
se but with the heightened evidentiary and tailoring standards that the Court has
embedded in those terms.252 This counsels a retooling of the remedial standard
for the state constitutional right to education, though not necessarily a rejection
of congruence and proportionality which "are hardly disagreeable qualities" 253
and have a fairly traceable lineage.254 Stripped to their essence, congruence and
proportionality entail separate measurements of the constitutional harm-remedy
nexus.
The "congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved" 255
calls for a determination of whether the remedy is designed to mitigate "a
sufficient quantity of identifiable constitutional violations or is instead too
underinclusive."256 In other words, congruence requires fit between the means
and ends: "the remedy presented should be reasonably precisely fixed to the
violation it was meant to address."257 Rather than focus on fit, proportionality
is "focused on the overall impact of the remedy as compared to the scope of the
harm." 258 That is, the remedy cannot be "so out of proportion to a supposed
remedial or preventive object that it [is not] responsive to, or designed to
prevent, unconstitutional behavior." 259
Put simply, the unadulterated versions of congruence and proportionality
are meant to ensure that the remedy appropriately targets the harm so as to
effectuate the constitutional right consistent with separation of powers
251. See Ren, supra note 249, at 1471; see also Graham, supra note 246, at 696 ("The
congruence and proportionality test does not allow Congress to maintain its status as a co-equal
partner in governance; rather, in this particular arena, it has been rendered subordinate by the
Court.").
252. Cf Zoller, supra note 242, at 570 ("The fact that the proportionality principle [has
served] to protect federalism and states' rights need not prejudice in any way what can be done
with it in the future.").
253. See Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMoRY L.J. 481, 524 (2002); see also
Yoshino, supra note 230, at 771 (observing that "layperson" and "dictionary definitions" of
congruent and proportional "may not seem a significant restriction of congressional power" and
indeed "might seem to provide Congress with more scope to act").
254. See generally Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of
ProportionalityAnalysis UnderSection 5 ofthe FourteenthAmendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 469,
473 (1999) (tracing lineage of proportionality and defending it as consistent with precedent and
principals governing the law of remedies) (citing, inter alia, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
421 (1819) ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."). But see Zoller, supra note 242, at
580 (countering that Hamilton and Schoenbrod's "alleged similarity between [congruence and
proportionality test] and [means-ends test derived from McCulloch] rests too much on their
appearances and misses the actual purpose of each test").
255. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
256. See Caminker, supra note 228, at 1154.
257. See Graham, supra note 246, at 693.
258. Id.
259. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
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principles.
These standards therefore "serve two basic functions" of
constitutional remedies. 260 And yet, Justice Scalia aptly described congruence
and proportionality as "flabby," in the sense that these standards lack resilience
and direction. 261 Rather than clarify their parameters, the Court has further
obscured their meaning by viewing "congruence and proportionality as
interchangeable terms without demarcating their respective spheres of
operation."262
Tailored to the state constitutional right to education's
jurisprudence, these standards should be separated for optimal performance.
Each should also be adapted, made more resilient, to correlate with the different
separation of powers concerns of legislative versus judicial remedies.
Such revisions yield a reasonable congruence standard forjudicial remedies
and a direct proportionality standard for legislative remedies. Let's start with
the latter.
A. Reviewing the Direct Proportionality of Legislative Remedies
Whereas the congruence and proportionality standard has been
insufficiently deferential to Congress, the standards of review for the state
constitutional right to education have been of late exceedingly deferential to
state legislatures.263 This has been especially true in the remedial and contempt
phases of adequacy litigation.
Prior to the advent of adequacy, several courts that held their state's
financing scheme unconstitutional "applied the means-ends test embodied in the
tiers of scrutiny, though often in unconventional ways."264 The tiers of scrutiny
(strict, intermediate, rational basis) were more suitable at that time, when most
courts were relying on equal protection guarantees and formulating the right to
education as immunity against unequal or inequitable funding.265 Construing
the right as an immunity relieved courts of the burden to specify exactly what
was required to remedy horizontal and vertical inequities. An "immunity
thwarts the state action, in effect disabling the legislature's power to enact its
chosen funding formula."266 Courts therefore did not need to entangle
themselves with the particulars of the remedy, they simply had to declare that
the financing system was not rationally related or narrowly tailored to the state's
legitimate or compelling interests and insist that the legislature sort out how to
cure the violation.267
260. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
261. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
262. See K. G. Jan Pillai, Incongruent Disproportionality,29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645,
651 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 654 ("[T]he Court seems to have consolidated
congruence and proportionality into a single integrated requirement of proportionality without
announcing that it was doing so.").
263. See generally Weishart, supra note 167 (examining the specified and unspecified
constitutional standards of review used in the three waves).
264. See id at 241, 242-50.
265. See id at 254.
266. Id at 255.
267. Id
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The shift to adequacy in the third wave demanded a new formulation of the
right to education, one that secured it not merely as an immunity disabling state
action but also as a claim-right compelling state action. 268 For that purpose,
rational basis review is too deferential to legislative prerogatives" and would
compel very little action. 269 "Utmost deference to the legislature is also
antithetical with the propensity of state courts to exert judicial authority to
conduct independent examinations of educational quality and craft their won
substantive adequacy standards." 270 Conversely, strict scrutiny's narrow
tailoring and compelling state interest requirements serve a "state-limiting
purpose" that proved "incompatible with the aim of positive claim-right
enforcement-which is not to restrain but to compel state action when it furthers
the interests protected by those rights." 271 "This mismatch is reflected in thirdwave adequacy decisions that did not apply strict scrutiny even when the right
to education was deemed fundamental, and in decisions that supposedly applied
strict scrutiny but nevertheless upheld alleged funding inadequacies."272
The fallback for courts that eventually abandoned the tiers of scrutiny was
"a bare bones means-ends test" that "assessed with the legislature did enough
(means) to provide a constitutionally adequate education (end)."273 But most
courts have not actually engaged in any meaningful means scrutiny recognizing
that (1) the vast majority of state constitutions grant the legislature plenary
power over education, (2) state constitution education clauses often obligate the
legislature in the first instance to provide and maintain a free, public, adequate
education, (3) the legislature and executive have prerogative over the state
budget, and (4) "the details of education policymaking are innumerable, testing
a delicate balancing of powers and responsibilities among coordinate branches
of government." 274 Therefore, most courts have conferred substantial deference
to the other branches in determining the means to fulfill a state's affirmative duty
to provide a constitutionally adequate education."275
In the liability phase of adequacy litigation, most courts have instead
engaged in a form of ends scrutiny-"acknowledging the many different ways
that adequacy standards can be satisfied, courts nevertheless insist that the
standards must be satisfied."276 At least in this early phase before the
legislature's remedy has been litigated, several courts were more confident "that
the facts conclusively established that the ends have not been or cannot be
achieved" under the existing financing scheme.277
Once the litigation
progressed into the remedial and contempt phases, however, courts that press on

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

256 (quotation marks and alternation omitted).
257 (citing cases).
259.
262-63 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
263 (citing cases).
263-64 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
265.
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(rather than dismiss the case) seem inclined to forsake ends scrutiny and review
instead the "fit between the legislative means and the constitutional ends."278
Notably, "when courts have upheld the financing scheme, often after successive
rounds of litigation, they have taken assurances from the fact that, even though
the ends have not yet been fully achieved, the means are reasonably calculated
to achieve them." 279 This pattern of "ends-to-fit review, while more
accommodating to the positive claim-right form of the right to education, has
not fully advanced the right's function to protection children from the harms of
educational disparities [and deprivations]."280 And it is at once more and less
deferential to the legislature than state separation of powers doctrine commands.
In theory, evaluating the fit or congruence between the legislative means
and the constitutional ends is less deferential when a tight fit is required. As it
turns out, most courts have required only a reasonable fit. 28 1 That brings the

standard closer in orientation to intermediate scrutiny or rational basis review. 282
But, if we start with the premise accepted by the overwhelming majority of
courts that judges should not scrutinize the legislative means, then any
evaluation of fit would seem to be a step too far.
A fit inquiry forces the court to discuss if not analyze the legislative means.
As previously explained, a few courts in the later remedial or contempt phases
of adequacy have denied plaintiffs relief because they do not want to be forced
to discuss, much less analyze or order, specific legislative means concerning
budget appropriations.2 83 Moreover, once a court that is willing to discuss
legislative means reaches the conclusion that those means are not reasonably
calculated to achieve the ends, it will be passing judgment on the legislative
means when the constitutional right compels state action, implying that the
legislature should do more or do differently.284 That would cross the separation
of powers boundary that courts have drawn for themselves.
In practice, courts have evaluated means-ends fit or congruence in a way
that is more deferential than necessary or favorable. As previously mentioned,
courts willing to discuss legislative means in the remedial and contempt phases
tend to retreat either by (1) approving a declaratory judgment that the financing
system remains unconstitutional while providing little remedial guidance, or (2)
upholding the system as constitutional because it is reasonably calculated to
achieve a constitutionally adequate education despite persistent educational

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
GEO. J.L.
283.
284.

Id at 264.
Id at 265-66.
Weishart, supra note 167, at 242.
See id at 264.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The RationalBasis Test Is Constitutional(andDesirable), 14
& PUB. POL'Y 401, 416 (2016).
See supra text accompanying note 188.
Cf CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED 136 (1997) ("[T]he decently eligible range of means and measures is one thing when
you are under no duty at all to act, and quite another when you are under a serious duty to act
effectively.").
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deprivations and disparities.2 85 As the remedial and contempt phases drag on,
however, courts that initially took option (1) almost inevitably take option (2)throwing their hands up in the air after protracted battles with recalcitrant
legislatures, as if to say that getting the legislature to make "a good faith effort"
is "the best that we can do."286 Either method of retreat results in the right's
under-enforcement and ultimately devaluation.287 Therefore, as applied to
legislative remedies, congruence or fit as a standard falls short of both
benchmarks, permitting remedies that might breach separation of powers and/or
failing to effectuate the right's protection function.
That leaves a form of ends scrutiny which is more deferential, in that it
requires virtually no evaluation of legislative means, and less deferential, in that
it is quite demanding, requiring achievement of the constitutional ends. Such
ends scrutiny might seem to strike the right balance, but some observers view it
as tipping the scales. Those who think such ends scrutiny is too deferential
accuse courts of engaging in "empty formalism," when it returns declaratory
judgments without much remedial guidance.288 Others think such ends scrutiny
is insufficiently deferential and accuse courts of engaging in "judicial activism,"
because a declaratory judgment can "read like legislation" yet "lead to a kind of
legislative learned helplessness," and because it requires "systemic" rather than
"individual remediation" that "sets up an obvious inter-branch conflict." 289
This Article is unlikely to persuade those who already hold the latter view,
that a judgment declaring the state has failed to discharge its duty to provide a
constitutionally adequate education amounts to judicial activism. Granted, a
declaratory judgment "can be quite coercive despite the absence of an immediate

285. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
286. See, e.g., Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State (Campbell 1), 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo.
1995); accord Campbell IV, 181 P.3d 43, 67 (Wyo. 2008) ("While perfection is not required or
expected, a good faith effort to preserve and protect our constitution's commitment to a sound
public education system is. We are convinced, as was the district court, that the state has met that
standard and will continue to do so in the future."); see also Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 971
A.2d 989, 1009 (N.J. 2009) ("The legislative and executive branches of government have enacted
a funding formula that is designed to achieve a thorough and efficient education for every child,
regardless of where he or she lives. . . . There is no absolute guarantee that [statute] will achieve
the results desired by all. The political branches of government, however, are entitled to take
reasoned steps, even if the outcome cannot be assured, to address the pressing social, economic,
and educational challenges confronting our state. They should not be locked in a constitutional
straitjacket."); Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 789-90 (Tex.
2005) ("Having carefully reviewed the evidence and the [factual] findings, we cannot conclude that
the Legislature has acted arbitrarily in structuring and funding the public education system so that
school districts are not reasonably able to afford all students the access to education and the
educational opportunity to accomplish a general diffusion of knowledge.").
287. See supra text accompanying note 48.
288. See Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 6, at 88.
289. See Bauries, supra note 14, at 985-87 ("It is damaging to the legitimacy of independent
state constitutionalism that these declarations exist. They illustrate an activism in reading state
constitutional terms that would never be tolerated at the federal level, and they accordingly call into
question the judicial federalism project.").
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sanction for noncompliance." 290 Some of the early, liability-phase adequacy
decisions that did not order injunctive relief nevertheless led to sweeping
reforms. 291 But those reforms were necessitated by giving effect to state
constitution education clauses which establish a claim-right to an adequate
education,292 not merely a "fiduciary duty" of "loyalty" and "due care" owed by
state legislators.293
Moreover, relatively few "courts have issued or
contemplated issuing policy-directive remedial orders," which perhaps could be
labeled 'activist' if one disregarded that, "in most of those cases, [courts] did so
only when forced by their recalcitrant legislatures after repeatedly trying"
deferential approaches.294 That declaratory judgments have led to significant
reforms also rebuts the charge that courts are engaging in empty formalism.
Even when very little remedial guidance is provided, declaratory judgments can
also supply much-needed "content" to the right to education.295
Observers are nevertheless correct that the current form of ends scrutiny
lacks balance. Remedial guidance clarifying "what the law proscribes" is
eventually needed to hold the legislature accountable and deter constitutional
violations.296 Otherwise, the legislature wins the battle by attrition (through
"legislative learned helplessness" or deliberate rebelliousness) and then the right
goes under-enforced.297 At the same time, the remedial standard cannot demand
absolute achievement of the constitutional ends, not when those ends are
educational adequacy and equity. 298 Those constitutional ends will probably
never be fully and permanently achieved, and "any feasible and normatively

290. See Weishart, supra note 11, at 946.
291. See id.; see also Buszin, supra note 50, at 1653 (noting reasons "that declaratory relief
alone may spur swift police change); Emily Chiang, Reviving the DeclaratoryJudgment: A New
Path to StructuralReform, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 549, 551-52 (2015) ("The declaratory judgment . .
can provide the same leverage to drive negotiation as a request for a structural injunction and it can
make the reform process more efficient and cost-effective, and thereby more available.").
292. See Weishart, supra note 11, at 948-49.
293. See Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 736, 748-59
(2012).
294. See Weishart, supra note 167, at 276.
295. See Weishart, supra note 11, at 946.
296. See REBELL, supra note 61, at 87 ("Lack of judicial resolve and absence of a clear
strategy for judicial oversight are often what provoke [legislative] resistance.").
297. See Black, supra note 30, at 470; see also Michael A. Rebell & Robert L.
Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement: The Remedies Problem Posed by Sheff v. O'Neill-and A
ProposedSolution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1115, 1146-47 (1997) ("[T]he proper role of the courts is to
explicate and apply to remedial issues the constitutional values at issue and to establish stable
implementation and monitoring processes that will ensure that these values are put into effect . .
but the judges should not fully formulate the substance of the remedy or micro-manage its
implementation.").
298. Cf Ryan, supra note 48, at 1256 ("Courts should set for themselves a more modest goal:
ensuring the opportunity for an adequate education by focusing on resources that are relevant to
that goal. They need not and should not be any more precise or ambitious than that. Courts should
be explicit about their own institutional limitations and the end goal of school funding litigation,
which should be to create the conditions for adequacy, not adequacy itself."); Fallon & Meltzer,
supra note 56, at 1778 ("Marbury's apparent promise of effective redress for all constitutional
violations reflects a principle, not an ironclad rule, and its ideal is not always attained.").
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acceptable policies for making progress toward either goal are liable to largely
coincide for the foreseeable future."299 So, it does not make sense to "analyze
educational opportunity at particular moments in time and order remedies in
response to that moment" as school finance decisions are so prone to do.300
Rather, the type of ends scrutiny needed is one that can provide some realistic
remedial guidance for long-term compliance.30' Such ends scrutiny calls for
proportionality, not balance.
Importing Section 5 proportionality ("focused on the overall impact of the
remedy as compared to the scope of the harm") will not do, however, because it
provides no real direction and thus permits the legislature to scale the remedy
for the harm to modest dimensions in the interest of politics and the "back-door
deals that typically influence remedies."302 If the remedy is to be calibrated in
relation to the harms the right to education is meant to protect against, it must be
designed to improve both vertical equity and adequacy.303 To facilitate their
mutually-reinforcing potential, vertical equity and adequacy must have "a
directly proportional, upward direction of fit" such that the relationship between
them should remain constant-as one improves so must the other by the same
factor.304 This direct proportionality standard does not demand the actual and
permanent achievement of vertical equity and adequacy. It focuses instead on
whether a legislative remedy is designed to advance both vertical equity and
adequacy in tandem to mitigate educational deprivations and disparities below
the adequacy threshold.
Above that threshold, judicial review of a legislative remedy should assess
whether "the margin between vertical equity and adequacy is proportional." 305
"That space would become disproportionate if, for example, children just
meeting the adequacy threshold could not compete on comparable terms for
admission to higher education and high-quality jobs with children soaring above
the adequacy threshold."306 Only if the legislative remedy causes such
disproportionality, must courts then require "the adequacy threshold to be
recalibrated to diminish the positional advantages held by children well above
the threshold, and require adjustments to the distribution of educational

&

299. See Elizabeth Anderson, Race, Culture, and Educational Opportunity, 10 THEORY
REs. EDUC. 105, 106 (2012).
300. See Black, supra note 30, at 469 ("[E]ducation is an ongoing project that requires
constant vigilance-the failure of which can span over years and decades.").
301. See id. at 469-70.
302. See Hinojosa & Walters, supra note 195, at 614 (arguing court should review legislative
remedies to ensure that they are "aimed at the harms shown in court" and "correct the violations
found"); Liu, supra note 232, at 401 ("[C]ourts have faulted state legislatures for fashioning
educational policy based on political or budgetary compromises rather than educationally relevant
factors.").
303. See supra text accompanying notes 211-14.
304. See Weishart, supra note 167, at 287-88.
305. See id. at 292.
306. Id. ("So, in addition to educational outcomes, courts assessing the proportionality of the
margin between adequacy and vertical equity could also consider evidence of socio-economic
mobility, college admissions, and patterns of racial and class segregation.").
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opportunities to ensure vertical equity necessary to meet the higher
thresholds."307 In short, direct proportionality plots a course for legislative
remedies to avoid unconstitutional excesses and holds the legislature
accountable when they do not.
Because state constitutions often obligate the legislature in the first instance
to discharge the duty to provide an adequate and equitable public education
system, the standard for determining whether there is a constitutional violation
should be the same as standard for determining whether the legislative remedy
will cure that violation. Significantly, this remedial standard does not restrict
the legislature or the executive in making and administering education policy
that regulates myriad issues beyond the public education system's adequacy and
equity. There are, of course, other important values and principles that should
guide education policymaking in that regard. Direct proportionality is meant
only to serve as a standard for legislative remedies after a court has determined
there has been a constitutional violation. Unencumbered from such a ruling, the
legislature and executive could enact measures, say, to improve racial and
socioeconomic integration, or provide more school choice, provided, of course,
that those measures do not otherwise conflict with federal or state law. 308 But
the legislature and executive retain most discretion over the means to remedy a
violation even when operating under the direct proportionality standard.
While educational rights can be identified in principle, imbuing the
rights with meaning in the real world requires an almost endless
number of small decisions relating to public policy, educational
philosophy, and economic management. Formulation of a remedy
requires choices among a wide variety of possibilities [considering]
constantly changing demographics of schools and the inconsistent ebb
and flow of tax dollars available in a volatile economy . . . . The

remedial fact-finding required to make reasoned choices in this
situation is essentially forward-looking, requiring expertise and
insight into the merits of various proposals for an on-going plan for
the remediation of violations of norms defined in the state
constitution.309
The legislature, executive agencies, and school boards are better equipped
to make specific remedial decisions and more politically accountable when they
do. 310 Direct proportionality simply points them all in the same direction and

307. Id. ("Such recalibration would also ensure that adequacy remains relational, responsive
to changing societal conditions and the needs of children.").
308. Cf Derek W. Black, Preferencing Educational Choice: The Constitutional Limits,
CORNELL
L.
REV.
(forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
5-6),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3058266 (contending that "states may not
favor choice programs over traditional public education systems" in ways that violate state
constitutions regarding "funding, oversight, student and teacher rights, and enrollment practices"
or enact choice policies that deprive students of "adequate and equitable public schools").
309. O'Brien, supra note 207, at 401.
310. See Rebell & Hughes, supra note 297, at 1146 ("The legislature's role is to develop
specific implementation approaches which will effectuate the constitutional values in a manner that
is consistent with other social needs and priorities, and the executive's fimction is to administer the
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preserves a limited but meaningful role for courts to ensure the upward trajectory
of vertical equity and adequacy. 311 This remedial standard therefore respects
state separation of powers principles yet demands that the legislative remedy
actually effectuate the right to education's protection function.
B. Reviewing the Reasonable Congruence of Judicial Remedies
Judicial remedies under the state constitutional right to education must
likewise comport with the two basic functions of constitutional remedies-to
redress the harm in effectuating the constitutional right and reinforce structural
norms like separation of powers and the rule of law.312 These considerations
carry more force in the case ofjudicial remedies given the judiciary's "dual role"
in our constitutional system to adjudicate claims and enforce separation of
powers principles on itself as well as the other coordinate branches.313 The
nexus to the constitutional right must therefore be even closer for judicial
remedies than legislative remedies-"any significant divergence between the
contours of the [right] and the relief granted represents an improper exercise of
judicial power [resembling] legislation."3 14 Provided, however, that the court
selects a remedy within those contours "to effectuate the constitutional rights at
stake, it is not legislating but performing its adjudicative function."315 This
recalls the line-drawing problem that provoked the congruence and
proportionality standard to distinguish impermissible legislative interpretation
from permissible legislative enforcement.316
In the case of judicial remedies, the remedial standard should assist courts

implementation plan in a manner consistent with the constitutional values and legislative criteria.").
311. Cf Gannon v. State (Gannon IV), 390 P.3d 461, 484 (Kan. 2017) ("[I]t is not
our province to consider the wisdom of legislative policy choices. The function of the court is
merely to ascertain and declare whether legislation was enacted in accordance with or in
contravention of the constitution--and not to approve or condemn the underlying policy.")
(quotation marks and alternation omitted); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 1), 703
A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.H. 1997) ("[W]e were not appointed to establish educational policy, nor to
determine the proper way to finance its implementation. That is why we leave such matters . . . to
the two co-equal branches of government [but i]t is our duty to uphold and implement the New
Hampshire Constitution."); Christopher A. Suarez, Courthouse, Statehouse, or Both? Redefining
Institutional Roles in School Finance Reform, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 539, 549 (2010) (book
review) ("[T]he extent to which courts exercise ongoing oversight should depend solely on
educational outcomes.").
312. See supra text accompanying note 56; accord Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding,
Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 224 n.21 (Conn. 2010) ("[W]e recognize that separation of powers
concerns necessarily will inform the creation of any remedy in this case, should one ultimately be
required.").
313. See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 289, 303 (1995).
314. See Tracy A. Thomas, Congress'Section5 Powerand Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 673, 733-34 (2001) (citing, inter alia, HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 668 (William Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip Frickey eds., 1994)).
315. See Bandes, supra note 313, at 336.
316. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
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in drawing the line between impermissible judicial legislation and permissible
judicial adjudication. Drawing that line can be difficult if and when a court is
disposed to ordering injunctive relief It is not so difficult when a court acts
wholly within its province to issue declaratory relief that interprets the
constitution or declares the state has or has not fulfilled the constitutional
ends.317 Indeed, a standalone remedial standard would be unnecessary when the
judicial remedy amounts to no more than a declaratory judgment.318
Injunctive relief, on the other hand, confers "broad discretionary powers"
on courts-powers typically exercised by the other branches in making and
administering policy. 319 The potential for broad discretion accompanying
injunctive relief is even more pronounced regarding the state constitutional right
to education which takes the form of an affirmative claim-right to an adequate
education. 320 "To enforce a positive right, courts must mandate a positive
remedy by requiring the state government to act and thereby fulfill the
constitutional right." 321 Hence, a court cannot enforce such a right simply with
a "preventive injunction" that orders the state "to stop the illegal conduct." 322
The injunctive relief must either be "reparative" in "correcting the existing

317. See Rell, 990 A.2d at 225 ("[I]t is well within the province of the judiciary to determine
whether a coordinate branch of government has conducted itself in accordance with the authority
conferred upon it by the constitution.") (quotation marks omitted); Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
Inc. v. State (CFE ll), 801 N.E.2d 326, 345 (N.Y. 2003) ("[I]t is the province of the Judicial branch
to define, and safeguard, rights provided by the New York State Constitution, and order redress for
violation of them."); Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 777
(Tex. 2005) ("The final authority to determine adherence to the Constitution resides with the
judiciary [; if] the legislature has not discharged its constitutional duty . .. it is our duty to say so.")
(quotation marks omitted); Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 319
(Wyo. 1980) ("Though the supreme court has the duty to give great deference to legislative
pronouncements and to uphold constitutionality when possible, it is the court's equally imperative
duty to declare a legislative enactment invalid if it transgresses the state constitution."). But see
supra note 295 and accompanying text.
318. See Chiang, supra note 291, at 584; cf Gannon v. State (Gannon 1l), 368 P.3d 1024,
1059 (Kan. 2016) ("[W]hile it is for the General Assembly to legislate a remedy, courts do possess
the authority to enforce their orders, since the power to declare a particular law or enactment
unconstitutional must include the power to require a revision of that enactment, to ensure that it is
then constitutional. If it did not, then the power to find a particular Act unconstitutional would be
a nullity. As a result there would be no enforceable remedy. A remedy that is never enforced is
truly not a remedy.") (quoting DeRolph v. State (DeRolph 1), 728 N.E.2d 993, 1002 (Ohio 2000)).
319. See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 635 (1982); see also Abram Chayes, The Role ofthe Judge
in PublicLaw Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292-93 (1976).
320. See supra notes 268, 271 and accompanying text.
321. State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 179 P.3d 366, 381 (Kan. 2008) (citing Helen
Hershkoff, PositiveRights and States Constitutions: The Limits ofFederalRationality Review, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1999)); Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 308 (Kan. 2005); accord
McCleary v. State (McCleary 1), 269 P.3d 227, 248 (Wash. 2012) ("[T]he court is concerned not
with whether the State has done too much, but with whether the State has done enough. Positive
constitutional rights do not restrain government action; they require it.").
322. See Tracy A. Thomas, The ProphylacticRemedy: Normative PrinciplesandDefinitional
Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 315-16 (2004) (citing, inter
alia, DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 164 (2d ed. 1993)).

2018

WEISHART: EDUCATION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

389

effects and consequences of that harm" or "structural" in compelling
organizational change, "rather than behavioral aspects, of an illegal
institution."323
Structural injunctions, and to a lesser extent reparative
injunctions, raise separation of powers concerns.324
Yet few state courts have ordered or authorized reparative or structural
injunctions under the state constitutional right to education.325
Indeed,
describing the operative order as reparative or structural in some of these cases
would be a bit of an overstatement.326 In truth, the vast majority of courts have
exercised restraint, with a minority contemplating or authorizing injunctive
relief only after wayward legislatures forced their hand.327 These courts have
concluded that they are empowered to provide a judicial remedy when the other
branches fail to take appropriate action. 328 But most often that judicial remedy
is little more than another fairly assertive declaratory judgment. The specter that
broad structural or reparative relief may yet be necessary, however, still gives
courts pause in later phases of adequacy litigation. Proposed fourth-wave
remedies (e.g., integration, universal preschool, school choice) do not assuage
such concerns; previously-sought adequacy remedies seem almost quaint by
comparison. So, there is an ever-pressing need for a remedial standard that can
323. See id. at 316-17; see also id. at 319 (proposing an alternative classification of the three
injunctions in which "[p]reventive relief addresses the core harm by ordering the cessation of illegal
activity. Reparative relief addresses the subsequent consequences of that harm by redressing the
resulting effects of the illegal act. Prophylactic relief focuses on the pre-harm time period in order
to direct conduct that has a tendency to contribute to or facilitate the primary harm.").
324. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1090 (2004) ("Structural injunctions are accused of
subverting [separation of powers] principles by excessively concentrating power in the court at the
expense of the electoral branches."); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of
FederalEquitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 661-63 (1978).
325. See supra text accompanying note 29.
326. See Weishart, supra note 167, at 276 n.333 ("[O]nly two of the seven courts ordered
specific legislation or budget appropriations. Two more merely contemplated issuing such orders,
or empowered the trial court to do so if necessary. Two courts ordered costing-out studies, while
another reserved the right to continue monitoring the capital funds budget. These are hardly
exemplars of judicial overreach.") (citations omitted).
327. See id.
328. Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State, 907 A.2d 988, 996 (N.H. 2006) ("[T]he
judiciary has a responsibility to ensure that constitutional rights not be hollowed out and, in the
absence of action by other branches, ajudicial remedy is not only appropriate but essential."); Hoke
Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State (Hoke 1), 599 S.E.2d 365, 393 (N.C. 2004) ("Certainly, when the State
fails to live up to its constitutional duties, a court is empowered to order the deficiency remedied,
and if the offending branch of government or its agents either fail to do so or have consistently
shown an inability to do so, a court is empowered to provide relief by imposing a specific remedy
and instructing the recalcitrant state actors to implement it."); State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist.
(Campbell 1l), 32 P.3d 325, 332-33 (Wyo. 2001) ("The legislature's failure to create a timely
remedy consistent with constitutional standards justifies the use of provisional remedies or other
equitable powers intended to spur action. When insufficient action in the legislative process occurs,
judicial monitoring in the remediation phase can help check political process defects and ensure
that meaningful relief effectuates the court's decision. When these defects lead to continued
constitutional violations, judicial action is entirely consistent with separation of powers principles
and the judicial role.") (citations omitted).
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assist courts in fashioning structural or reparative injunctions that adhere to state
separation of powers principles.
Section 5 congruence and proportionality was originally devised as a
"nexus test in the prophylactic legislation context" and thus presumably could
apply as a "the test for properly tailored judicial prophylactic remedies." 329 But
Section

5 proportionality 330 would afford

courts too much latitude

in

determining the scope of the injunctive relief in relation to the scope of the harm.
Remedial proportionality in and of itself provides no criteria for that
determination. 331 To be sure, subjectivity cannot be eliminated completely from
the act of judging, but a standard that permits courts to determine the scope of
the harm vis-A-vis the remedy licenses too much discretion.332 As the history of
federal desegregation litigation suggests, the scope can be interpreted broadly to
remedy harms having some causal link to educational opportunity or narrowly
to enjoin only specific state-created harms.333 Given the recent history of school
finance litigation, it seems more likely that courts would use such discretion to
narrow rather than broaden the scope of relief. In either case, the two functions
of constitutional remedies would be frustrated: a narrow scope would keep the
right under-enforced, a broad scope could institute a structural breach in the
separation of powers.
The proper focus, then, is not on the proportional scope of the harm and
remedy but on the nexus between the right and the remedy.334 To be more
precise, courts should determine whether the judicial remedy is calculated to
effectuate the constitutional right's function.335 For that purpose, congruence
329. See Thomas, supra note 322, at 349.
330. See Caminker, supra note 228, at 1154 (noting that the focus of Section 5 proportionality
is "on the calibration or balance between the magnitude of the prophylactic remedy and the
magnitude of the wrong or problem being addressed").
331. See Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence of
Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 126-29 (2007) ("The ability to alter the comparison point
demonstrates the manipulability of the proportionality rule. It is this manipulability in the framing
of the proportionality question that renders the standard subjective. . . . Add to this framing
discretion a secondary level of subjectivity, which enters judicial decisions by the selection of the
analytical inputs for the proportionality calculus. Subjectivity enters into the decisionmaking as the
judges select the appropriate inputs for consideration--for example evaluating the magnitude of the
harm.").
332. See Wendy Parker, The Supreme CourtandPublicLaw Remedies: A Tale ofTwo Kansas
Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 513 (1999) ("Stating that the scope of the injunction will be defined
by the scope of the violation and will be confined to restoring the victims to their rightful place
reveals very little about what the remedy should be. This loose standard does not logically compel
a particular result, thus permitting a great deal of unrestricted discretion.").
333. See Thomas, supra note 331, at 128; see, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S.
267, 280 (1977) ("[T]he nature of the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and
scope of the constitutional violation. The remedy must therefore be related to the condition alleged
to offend the Constitution.") (citation and quotation marks omitted); accord Horton v. Meskill
(HortonII), 486 A.2d 1099, 1111 (Conn. 1985).
334. See Dellinger, supra note 209, at 1551; Thomas, supra note 314, at 744 ("The
constitutional mandate is simply that some remedy, not any particular remedy, must be applied by
the courts in the exercise of their judicial power to effectuate constitutional rights.").
335. Cf Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1l), 575 A.2d 359, 367 (N.J. 1990) ("In order to pass on
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requiring means-ends fit is more suitable than proportionality. The fit can neither
be too strict nor too lose, however. A strict fit would preclude injunctive relief
in almost every case in which the court had any doubt about the likelihood that
the remedy would actually effectuate the right's function. Insisting on a strict
fit would also be inconsistent with the broad authority of state courts to fashion
equitable remedies to effectuate constitutional rights.336 Conversely, a loose fit
at a sufficient level of generality would bring the means-ends review close to the
point of being a tautology, permitting considerable variance and judicial
remedies that diverge significantly from the right's function.337
Courts reviewing legislative action in the remedial phases of adequacy
litigation seemed to have settled in the middle on a reasonable degree of fit,
demanding that the legislative means be "reasonably calculated" to achieve the
constitutional ends.338 Courts reviewing the casual nexus between injunctive
relief and the right to education's function should demand no more and less of
judges who are already somewhat constrained by their reliance on adversarial
litigants to adduce the necessary evidence. 339 Reasonableness, not certainty,
should also guide courts in weighing that evidence. Trial court factual findings
in school finance cases are often entitled to a "substantial evidence" standard of
review. 340 "Substantial evidence is such legal and relevant evidence as a
reasonable person might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion." 34 1 No
plaintiffs' contention, we must once again, in the context of this case, define the scope and content
of the constitutional provision. That definition is critical to our determination of a remedy. While
precision in such definition is desirable, certain considerations suggest caution against
constitutional absolutism in this area.").
336. See Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 227, at 979 ("[S]tate courts remain common-law
generalists with equitable and inherent authority to create law, shape policy, and devise remedies.");
accord State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. (Campbell II), 32 P.3d 325, 332 (Wyo. 2001) ("The
legislature's failure to create a timely remedy consistent with constitutional standards justifies the
use of provisional remedies or other equitable powers intended to spur action.").
337. See Parker, supra note 332, at 519 ("[I]f the connection between right and remedy is
loose, then the right cannot determine the remedy. As a result, factors other than the definition of
the right must be considered in determining the remedy. The right-remedy connection, although it
appears to permit little 'choice' in crafting the remedy, actually allows a great deal of choice
because of its indeterminacy.").
338. See Weishart, supra note 167, at 265-66.
339. See Hershkoff, supra note 321, at 1175-78 (acknowledging some of the comparative
disadvantages of judicial fact-finding but contending that state courts can mitigate if not overcome
these disadvantages."). See generally William S. Koski, Courthouses vs. Statehouses, 109 MICH.
L. REV. 923 (2011) (book review).
340. See, e.g., Gannon v. State (Gannon 1), 319 P.3d 1196, 1246 (Kan. 2014); Leandro v.
State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (N.C. 1997); Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
176 S.W.3d 746, at 790 (Tex. 2005); McCleary v. State (McCleary 1), 269 P.3d 227, 253 (Wash.
2012). "Most of the states use the term clearly erroneous and similar terms (e.g. clear error and
clear and convincing) in connection with findings of fact by the trial court." Richard H. W. Maloy,
"StandardsofReview "- Just A Tip of the Icicle, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 603, 623 (2000). But
the clearly erroneous standard often means that a trial court's factual finding will be upheld if
"supported by substantial evidence." Id at 622 ("It has been said that the test of whether the findings
of the trial court were clearly erroneous is whether there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the trier of fact.") (quotation marks omitted).
341. See Gannon I, 319 P.3d at 1240 (quoting Owen Lumber Co. v. Chartrand, 157 P.3d 1109
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lesser or greater standard should apply in reviewing the factual nexus between
the injunctive relief and the right to education's function.
In total, the remedial standard entails an inquiry into whether the judicial
remedy is reasonably congruent with the constitutional right's function. A court
applying that standard under the state constitutional right to education must
determine whether substantial evidence shows that the requested injunctive
relief is reasonably calculated to set both vertical equity and adequacy on an
upward trajectory.342
Such a standard provokes an immediate question: Can a court award relief
on other grounds, besides vertical equity and adequacy? The answer is: Of
course, a court would not be bound by the reasonable congruence standard in
awarding relief that is calculated to effectuate an education statute or regulation,
or even some other constitutional provision, e.g., due process, that implicates
education rights. But if a court is awarding relief to effectuate the state
constitutional right to education, then it should be bound by that right's function
to protect children from the harms of educational deprivations and disparities.
And it should be bound to effectuate that function with injunctive relief that
respects state separation of powers principles.
C. Previewing the Reasonable Congruence ofIntegration and Choice
Remedies
Nearly twenty years after James Ryan first proposed them as fourth-wave
remedies, integration and choice are still being pursued in litigation. 343 Cruz-

Guzman resumes a prior legal challenge to segregated schools, Minneapolis
NAACP, that previously settled in Sheff s wake.344 The complaint alleges that
de facto racial and socioeconomic segregation in St. Paul and Minneapolis
public schools deprives children of an adequate education guaranteed by the
state constitution.345 The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief
compelling "an adequate and desegregated education." 346 Martinez v. Malloy
challenges Connecticut statutes and policies "that place limitations on the
number of charter schools, on interdistrict choice, and on magnet schools aimed
at increasing integration." 347 The complaint avers that such "anti-opportunity
laws" violate students' fundamental liberty and equality interests to substantial

(Kan. 2007)).
342. The presumption that the injunctive relief is justified under this standard can be rebutted
if, for instance, the requested relief contravenes some other state or federal law.
343. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Cruz-Guzman v. State, NO. 27-CV-15-19117 (Minn.
4th Jud. Dist. Nov. 5, 2015); Complaint at 4-6, Martinez v. Malloy, No. 3:16-cv-01439 (D. Conn.
Aug. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Martinez Complaint].
344. See Black, supra note 59, at 382-83.
345. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 534-36 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (reversing
trial court's denial of motion to dismiss the complaint as nonjusticiable), review granted(Apr. 26,
2017). In the interest of full disclosure, this Article's author joined an amicus brief of education
law scholars filed with the Minnesota Supreme Court in support of Cruz-Guzman plaintiffs.
346. Id. at 535.
347. Koski, supra note 46, at 1923.
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equal and minimally adequate educational opportunities under the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 348 Although
the Connecticut complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under the U.S.
Constitution, similar claims have been alleged in neighboring Massachusetts
under the education clause, equal protection, and due process provisions of the
state constitution. 3
As none of these challenges have proceeded to a full trial on the merits,
there is insufficient evidence from which to assess the reasonable congruence of
these proposed judicial remedies. Part of the reason to preview that remedial
standard, nevertheless, is to suggest just that insufficient evidence may yet
prove a temporary impediment for both remedies.
It is with some irony that there might be insufficient evidence that the
integration remedy would advance children's equality interests in vertically
equitable educational opportunities or that the choice remedy would advance
children's liberty interests in an adequate education. After all, integration and
choice are touted for advancing equality and liberty, respectively. But note the
equality and liberty purportedly advanced is arguably of a different kind or
degree than that construed in the jurisprudence of the state constitutional right
to education.
Integration is perceived to advance a type of social equality essential for
equal citizenship,350 stipulating that children of different races or classes be
treated the same (horizontal equity), not differently based on their needs (vertical
equity). Choice is perceived to advance the negative liberties of parents to direct
the education of their children, 351not necessarily the positive liberties of children
as cultivated through an adequate education. In contrasting these remedies, it
should be noted that forced integration is criticized for subverting the negative
liberty aims of school choice by restraining parental and local control, 352
348. Martinez Complaint, supra note 344, at 55-68.
349. See Doe v. Sec'y of Educ., 95 N.E.3d 241 (Mass. 2018) (affirming trial court's dismissal
of complaint alleging statutory cap on charter schools violated state constitution education clause
and equal protection guarantees, as well as due process and liberty provisions).
350. See Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 271-72 (2006)
("[T]he integration vision most closely associated with the Civil Rights Movement had three
primary characteristics: (i) the belief that assimilation would eventually cure racial bigotry, (ii) the
expectation that race mixing under conditions of social equality would break down racial
stereotypes and allow members of each group to appreciate a common, shared humanity, and (iii)
the belief that integration would eradicate the advantages whites had accrued through segregation.")
(citations and quotation marks omitted); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution
and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 338 (1986) ("The social vision nourished by the
constitutional principle of equal citizenship not only tolerates but encourages a broad range of
efforts to promote the integration of American society."). See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON,
THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION (2nd ed. 2010).
351. See JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE
FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978). See generally Martha Minow, Confrontingthe Seduction ofChoice:
Law, Education, andAmerican Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 819-21 (2011).
352. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The Jurisprudence of Choice and
Diversity in Race and Sex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 455, 462 (2005) ("In the
desegregation area, the argument is that courts should end forced integration and thus restore
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whereas limitless school choice is criticized for subverting the social equality
objectives of integration by enabling or tolerating de facto segregation.353
Setting aside whether such criticisms are fair or unavoidable, there is a
longstanding tension between integration and choice,354 one that pits liberty
interests versus equality interests rather than encourage their mutuallyreinforcing tendencies in a way envisioned by this Article's proposed remedial
standards.
The reasonable congruence standard indeed requires the injunctive remedy
to advance both equality and liberty interests. Specifically, the question is
whether there is substantial evidence that integration or choice is reasonably
calculated to set both vertical equity and adequacy on an upward trajectory or
otherwise maintain their direct proportionality.
Answering that question
depends, of course, on exactly how those remedies could be structured by a court
and implemented by school authorities. Evaluating all the options would require
another article or two. 355 What can be accomplished here is to observe some

evidentiary deficits that either remedy would have to overcome as a general
matter, if courts had to satisfy the reasonable congruence standard before issuing
injunctive relief.
There is substantial social science research indicating that racial and
socioeconomic integration could advance adequacy by improving educational
quality, outcomes, and life chances overall and reducing achievement gaps.356

&

&

parental selection of schools in their chosen residential neighborhoods."); accord Milliken v.
Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) ("No single tradition in public education is more
deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools
and to quality of the educational process.").
353. See, e.g., Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice As Racial
Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1117 (2014) ("School-choice plans only compound the de
facto school segregation that makes American public schools more segregated now than they were
at the time of Brown v. Board ofEducation.").
354. Michael Heise, FromNo ChildLeft Behind to Every Student Succeeds: Back to A Future
for Education Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1859, 1882 (2017) (noting "the plethora of school
choice options-options that exist within the public school sphere as well as options between the
public and non-public school markets").
355. See Steven L. Nelson, Still Serving Two Masters? Evaluating the Conflict Between
School Choice and DesegregationUnder the Lens of CriticalRace Theory, 26 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
43, 45-51 (2017).
356. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 59, at 555-60 (citing research); Black, supra note 59, at 40415 (citing research); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral
Efforts to Achieve Diversity andAvoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50
B.C. L. REV. 277, 327-36 (2009) (citing research); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Mokubung Nkomo
George L. Wimberly, Integrated Schooling, Life Course Outcomes, and Social Cohesion in
Multiethnic DemocraticStudies, 36 REV. RES. EDUC. 197-238 (2012); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson
Martha Bottia, IntegratedEducation and Mathematics Outcomes: A Synthesis of Social Science
Research, 88 N.C. L. REV. 993, 995 (2010); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School
Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1545, 1546-47 (2007); Argun Saatcioglu,DisentanglingSchool- and
Student-Level Effects of DesegregationandResegregation on the DropoutProblem in Urban High
Schools: Evidence From the Cleveland Municipal School District, 1977-1998, 112 TEACHERS
COLL. REc. 1391, 1419, 1427 (2010); GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
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That social science is not indisputable, but it need only be sufficient to support
the conclusion of a reasonable person under the substantial evidence standard.357
There is little reason to believe that advancing adequacy in this way would cause
vertical inequities. Quite the opposite, integration would mitigate vertical
inequities below the adequacy threshold to the extent that it reduces the number
of students trapped in racially-isolated, high-poverty schools.358
It is less certain, however, whether integrating schools in itself would
mitigate enough vertical inequities below the adequacy threshold. 359 Even more
unclear is whether it would mitigate vertical inequities above that threshold or
address the needs of particular students to meet higher thresholds. "So what?"
might be the obvious reply. Educational justice will be progressed anyway,
particularly if one is more concerned with fostering social equality through
integration rather than vertical equity. 360 And yet, if the law is to advance social
equality in order to guarantee equal citizenship, that cause ultimately will be
imperiled by the failure to advance vertical equity in direct proportion with
adequacy.361

PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 40

(2014),
https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-anddiversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-uncertain-future/Brown-at-60051814.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4AG-H2TU]; NAT'L ACAD. OF EDUC., RACE-CONSCIOUS
POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING STUDENTS TO SCHOOLS: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND SUPREME
COURT
CASES
32
(Robert
L.
Linn
& Kevin
G.
Welner,
eds.,
2007),

&

http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/Brief-NAE.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LBS-BSA5]; Rucker C. Johnson,
Long-Run Impacts ofSchool Desegregation & School Quality on Adult Attainments 2, 18-21 (Nat'l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
16664)
(revised
Sept.
2015),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6664.pdf [https://perma.cc/56AB-6Q2F].
357. See supra text accompanying notes 340-41.
358. Cf Robinson, supra note 356, at 330 ("Research from the Civil Rights Project
documents how racially isolated schools experience high concentrations of poverty, which brings
to schools a variety of inequalities that result in inferior educational opportunities for their students.
For instance, concentrated poverty brings to the schoolhouse door less qualified, less experienced
teachers, lower levels of peer group competition, more limited curricula taught at less challenging
levels, more serious health problems, much more turnover of enrollment, and many other factors
that seriously affect academic achievement.") (citations and quotation marks omitted).
359. Cf Liu, supra note 83, at 100 ("Pupil assignment alone does not automatically remedy
the impact of previous, unlawful educational isolation; the consequences linger and can be dealt
with only by independent measures. [For example], speech habits acquired in a segregated system
do not vanish simply by moving the child to a desegregated school. The root condition shown by
this record must be treated directly by special training at the hands of teachers prepared for that
task."); Stuart Biegel, Court-MandatedEducation Reform: The San FranciscoExperience andthe
Shaping ofEducationalPolicy After Seattle-Louisville and Ho v. SFUSD, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS.
CIV. LIBERTIES 159, 163 (2008) ("Too often, desegregation plans focusing on desegregation alone
were seen as viable and complete remedies, and too often they did not succeed in implementing the
mandate of Brown. Yet, ... when race-conscious strategies are part and parcel of a much larger and
multi-faceted menu of reform efforts... everyone benefits and lasting change is the ultimate
result.").
360. Cf Derek W. Black, In Defense of Voluntary Desegregation:All Things Are Not Equal,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 154, 160 (2009) (observing differences between equity and
diversity desegregation plans).
361. See supra text accompanying notes 197-98, 203, 205; cf Liu, supra note 82, at 105
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Integration plans conceivably could be structured and implemented so that
"the fate of disadvantaged students [are] tied to the fate of their more advantaged
peers." 362 There was a time when the U.S. Supreme Court approved
desegregation plans that included a wide range of compensatory services that
"channeled additional resources to minority schools where racial balance could
not be achieved through intradistrict busing." 363 The Court later curtailed federal
courts' discretion in this regard.364 In any case, the remedial strategy generally
has been an either-or proposition: either integration or compensatory services,

366
not both. 365 Although Sheff has raised the prospect for a "doctrine synthesis,"

the coupling of integration and vertical equity measures has not been pursued to
a sufficient degree, which potentially limits existing social science research that
could satisfy the reasonable congruence standard.
Conversely, there may be substantial evidence that choice plans are
reasonably calculated to advance vertical equity but not adequacy. Some see a
clear link between choice and equity: "The core principle of school choice is an
equitable one," they contend, because "school choice grants poorer students an
opportunity the chance to choose their own schools that is now reserved for
wealthier students."367 Others remain highly skeptical of that link given the
origins of school choice. Early voucher proponents very much wanted "to
replace the current system of public education with a virtually unregulated,
market-driven alternative."368 Choice plans were also proposed to derail
desegregation efforts.369 Contemporary proponents who "occupy the political
center," nevertheless, purport to view school choice as a necessary "social
intervention to aid the most disadvantaged," although some undoubtedly harbor
"a broader agenda."370

("Although the relative importance of redistributing students versus redistributing resources will
be a question for the ages, it would be surprising if genuine equality of educational opportunity did
not ultimately require both.").
362. See Ryan, supra note 55, at 259.
363. See Liu, supra note 82, at 99-100 (citing Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S.
267, 275-77, 279-88 (1977)). See generally Tracy Ellen Sivitz, Note, Eliminatingthe Continuing
Effects of the Violation: Compensatory Education As A Remedy for Unlawful School Segregation,
97 YALE L.J. 1173 (1988).
364. See generally Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins and the De FactoAbandonment
of Court-EnforcedDesegregation, 71 WASH. L. REV. 597 (1996).
365. See Liu, supra note 82, at 102.
366. See id at 105.
367. James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The PoliticalEconomy of School Choice, 111 YALE
L.J. 2043, 2051 (2002); see also Janelle Scott, School Choice as a Civil Right: The Political
Constructionofa Claim andIts ImplicationsforSchool Desegregation,in INTEGRATING SCHOOLS
IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: NEW POLICIES AND LEGAL OPTIONS FOR A MULTIRACIAL
GENERATION 33-38 (Erica Frankenberg & Elizabeth Debray eds., 2011).

368. Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve Desegregation, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 812 (2005).

369. James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice and the Suburban Veto, 90 VA. L. REV. 1635,
1636 (2004).
370. See Liu & Taylor, supra note 368, at 813-14; see also TERRY M. MOE, SPECIAL
INTEREST: TEACHERS UNIONS AND AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 329 (2011) ("The modem
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Whether choice proponents truly have equity in mind or not, choice plans
tend to serve disadvantaged children. Most but not all public voucher programs
take "a targeted approach, conditioning eligibility on the basis of income, prior
attendance at a low-performing school, or some other measure of educational
disadvantaged." 371 "Charter schools educate a disproportionate number of poor,
low-performing, and African-American students." 372 And, "school-districtwide choice programs are also often conceptualized as a means of improving
educational options for poor and minority students."373
Given the student populations they tend to serve, there is social science
research suggesting that choice plans could advance vertical equity.374 As with

arguments for vouchers have less to do with free markets than with social equity. They also have
less to do with theory than with the commonsense notion that disadvantaged kids should never be
forced to attend failing schools and that they should be given as many attractive educational
opportunities as possible.").
371. See Liu & Taylor, supra note 368, at 813; Erika K. Wilson, BlurredLines: PublicSchool
Reforms and the Privatization of Public Education, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 189, 211 n.109
(2016) ("Many of the voucher programs are limited to students who are poor and/or attending a
school that is deemed failing or performing poorly."). But see id. at 219 ("[V]oucher programs are
limited in the amount that they will pay which limits the ability of students using vouchers to attend
more expensive and higher quality private schools."); Heise, supra note 354, at 1886 ("Contributing
much to the recent growth in publicly funded voucher programs is a shift in voucher programs'
initial focus on students from low-income households and those assigned to struggling public
schools to a broader slice of middle-class students. ... Now, ironically, successful political support
for voucher programs typically requires that the programs include middle-class families as well.").
372. James E. Ryan, CharterSchools and Public Education, 4 STAN. J. CV. RTS. & CIV.
LIBERTIES 393, 399 (2008); see also Wilson, supra note 371, at 212-13 ("In school systems serving
large numbers of poor and minority students, charter schools have grown so much that in many
instances they either approximate or exceed the number of traditional public schools in the school
district."). But see id at 219 ("[T]he number of high quality charter schools, particularly in school
districts serving predominantly poor and minority students, is limited."); Julian Vasquez Heilig et
al., Separate and Unequal? The Problematic Segregation of Special Populations in Charter
Schools Relative to TraditionalPublic Schools, 27 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 251, 278 (2016) ("Our
analysis, which looked at high-need student enrollment in charter schools relative to non-charter
public schools at three unit of analysis (state, district, and local), illustrates that the claims by many
charter school providers that they are serving disadvantaged students at comparable rates equal to
or greater than public schools is misleading when examined spatially."); U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-543, CHARTER SCHOOLS: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL ATTENTION
NEEDED TO HELP PROTECT ACCESS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 7 fig.2 (2012) (finding
students with disabilities composed 11.1% of the national school-aged population but 8.2% of the
charter school population).
373. Wilson, supra note 371, at 214; but see id at 219 ("District-wide school choice programs
also have limited number of slots for the high quality and most sought after schools.").
374. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, Sector Agnosticism and the Coming Transformation of
Education Law, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18-19 nn. 61-62 (2017) ("The emerging consensus among
education scholars is that even if charter schools do not perform better overall than traditional
public schools, they do, on average, a better job-in some cases, a much betterjob-at educating
disadvantaged urban students, especially minority students and English language learners.") (citing
research); Anna J. Egalite & Patrick J. Wolf, A Review ofthe EmpiricalResearch on PrivateSchool
Choice, 91 PEABODY J. EDUC. 441 (2016); Alejandra Mizala & Florencia Torche, Means-Tested
School Vouchers andEducationalAchievement: Evidencefrom Chile's Universal Voucher System,
674 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 163 (2017).
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the integration research, this choice research is far from indisputable and indeed
has been intensely contested.375 But it may be sufficient to meet the substantial
evidence standard.
The same cannot be said with any confidence about the potential of choice
plans to advance adequacy. "First of all, researchers find charter schools
difficult to study due to 'the constant flux of schools and students'. . . [and
particularly] challenging to study in the aggregate."376 Although there are
significant differences in charter school laws and policies, some studies "draw
broad policy conclusions from analyses of a relatively small population of
charter school students [whereas other] studies that are more national in scope
tend to indiscriminately combine results from different states." 37 More rigorous
studies nevertheless are mixed, finding "charter schools on average produce
better results in math and reading than traditional public schools" in some states
but not others. 378 Hence, "even though charter schools have captured the
imagination of many school reformers and the ire of others, little credible
evidence about their impact on student achievement is available." 379 Although
there is more research on voucher programs, that research is likewise mixed
concerning their "impact on student achievement." 380 To the extent that open375. See, e.g., Minow, supra 351, at 843-48 (contending that school choice harms
disadvantaged student populations and further racial and socioeconomic segregation); Nelson,
supra note 356, at 49 ("School choice policies that are confined to poor, urban boundaries are
unable to achieve equity due to their geographic limitations.").
376. Abigail Hoglund-Shen, Note, Fixer Upper: Reforming Vergara's Teacher Tenure
Statutes, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1151, 1168 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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enrollment, interdistrict, or magnet schools count as choice not integration plans,
they have a better track record, 381 although funding remains relatively minimal
as does the research.382
Again, we can undertake only so much analysis at this juncture, without the
benefit of a trial on the merits. This preview of proposed remedies suggests,
however, that reasonable congruence is a fairly demanding but not unyielding
standard for injunctive relief-a standard that inevitably interjects itself into the
debate about the reliability of social science evidence concerning education
policy. Some scholars urge "caution against the fetishization of evidence in
social science policymaking."383 There are "limits in the state of the research,
difficulties in conducting this kind of social science research in the first place,
and challenges in implementing what research findings exist. 384 Other
scholars, sensitive to these complexities, suggest it may be time to throw a little
caution to the wind-"in certain hard cases, where litigants have a strong
argument for a proposed intervention but have been unable to produce credible
estimates of its likely effect because of the state's control over treatment
assignment, it may be appropriate for courts to issue a temporary experiment
remedy, rather than entering a permanent, state-wide injunction or letting the
state off the hook entirely."3 85
The reasonable congruence standard attempts to forge some middle ground,
insisting on a reasonably close nexus between the right's function and the
proposed injunctive relief to cabin judicial discretion while preserving the
somewhat more accommodating substantial evidence standard state courts
already employ. The standard thus serves as "the limiting principle" that James
Ryan called for nearly twenty years ago for courts considering potential fourthwave remedies.386 By contrast, the direct proportionality standard for legislative
https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20104018/pdf/ 2 0 10 4 0 1 8 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/6X3L-DB5V]
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remedies should be viewed as a maximizing principle, one that continually
nudges lawmakers to keep adequacy and vertical equity on an upward, mutuallyreinforcing trajectory.
CONCLUSION

There is hope that before it is all written the story of education rights
litigation will bear the hallmarks not of a Russian novel in which "everyone dies
in the end" but of a distinctly American novel, in the mode of Fitzgerald, that
chronicles "who we want to be." 387 If it is the litigation that expresses what we
want educational opportunity to be, it is the remedy that expresses what
educational opportunity will be.
With so much depending on the remedies, it is bewildering that so little
attention has been paid to the standards courts use to evaluate them. Courts
should make up for lost time and adopt remedial standards that restore
confidence that judges can approve legislative and judicial remedies that
effectuate the right to education without transgressing separation of powers.
Perhaps in so doing, courts will succeed in toning down the battle rhetoric which
makes for good drama but not good law. They might also succeed in restoring
balance to the judiciary's tactical options: Interpret. Engage. Enforce.

alter the definition of an adequate or equal education will have to articulate a limiting principlei.e., a principle that courts (if so inclined or inhibited) could use to distinguish valid from invalid
claims.").
387. MAUREEN CORRIGAN, So WE READ ON: HOW THE GREAT GATSBY CAME TO BE AND
WHY IT ENDURES 4 (2014).

